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Mitigation and the Capital Defendant
Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of
Autonomy and the Hidden Discourse of
Collective Responsibility
DANIEL R. WILLIAMS*
There are instances when the doing of an act in the name of
autonomy represents the very negation of it. Such is the case with
a mitigation waiver.
INTRODUCTION
The defendant has been convicted of a capital offense. The litigants
enter into the penalty phase, that phase of the capital trial where the
defense has the opportunity to counter the prosecution's portrayal of the
defendant as a vicious, cruel, remorseless killer who deserves to die;
counter it with evidence about the defendant's particular life
circumstances, his childhood traumas, his cognitive and emotional
deficits, his drug and alcohol addiction, his poor education, his
impoverished material and stunted emotional existence. His loves, fears,
disappointments. His good deeds, too-should resourceful investigation
and luck uncover them. The judge is committed to giving the defense
wide latitude in its evidentiary presentation.' But the defendant
announces, "I don't want my lawyer to do anything to try to save my life.
I waive my right to present mitigation. It's my life. It's my case. This is
my case. Let the prosecution do what it wants to do and the jury can vote
to have me killed. I'm fine with that." The judge wants to say, you can't
do that, you don't have that prerogative, because her first thought is that
the defendant cannot thwart his lawyer's best efforts to present the best
mitigation case possible.
But why can't he? Doesn't he have a point? It is his right, his case,
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. This Article benefited from
helpful comments by colleagues at a Northeastern Law faculty workshop. I am particularly grateful to
Dan Givelber, a very generous colleague, and to my research assistant, Paul Heron.
i. "Wide latitude" is the appropriate judicial posture when it comes to admitting mitigation
evidence. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
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after all. What if the defendant is seeking to express remorse, a craving
for punishment associated with a crippling guilt that he feels can be
expiated, if at all, only by capitulating to or endorsing the prosecution's
quest for a death sentence?2 If guilt is a stain, and punishment the
cleansing of it, then what more personal decision is there than the
defendant's voluntary submission to the process of punishment? 3 Aside
from that, he could have opted to represent himself and thereby directly
controlled what path to take in the litigation.4 Why, then, short of finding
him incompetent,' should the judge find that he ought to lose that
authority to control the direction of his case simply because he wisely
allowed himself to be represented by counsel? After all, clients dictate
litigation goals; lawyers have the prerogative over how to accomplish
them.
Still, our judge cannot shake the intuition that allowing the
defendant to veto mitigation subverts the legitimacy-that is, the moral
6justifiability -of the entire capital-sentencing process. Without amitigation presentation and a robust adversarial contest, how is the jury
2. See PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, 100-02 (Emerson Buchanan trans., 1969) (noting
that a guilty person suffers a powerful feeling of unworthiness that generates a craving for
punishment).
3. See George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN LAW 163, 168-72 (2004) (discussing guilt as a "stain" to be cleansed).
4. It is often noted in this context that disallowing a defendant's veto of a mitigation
presentation is incompatible with the right to self-representation, recognized in Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975). See United States v. Davis, 285 F.3 d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied White v.
United States, 537 U.S. lo66 (2002); see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA.
L. REV. 1363, 1385 (1988).
5. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-400 (1993) (competency standard for waiving
counsel and pleading guilty is no different than the standard for competency to stand trial, even in a
case involving a defendant seeking to volunteer for execution).
6. I will in this Article phrase what this hypothetical defendant seeks to do as a "veto" over a
mitigation presentation or as simply a "mitigation waiver." I have in mind the capital defendant's
desire to bar completely the jury's consideration of any mitigation evidence that could be adduced in
the penalty phase of the capital prosecution. I do not include in this notion of veto those rare capital
defendants who, after consulting with counsel (or, in the case of those defendants representing
themselves, their back-up counsel, appointed pursuant to McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. I68 (1984)),
decide that the better tactical move is to present little or no mitigation evidence-perhaps out of fear
that an evidentiary presentation will open the door to damaging prosecutorial evidence. Such a
decision reflects not an abandonment of litigation, but the exercise of choice to enhance the chances of
securing a non-death sentence. So, when a capital defendant decides with the aid of counsel not to
present mitigation in order to shape an adversarial presentation with the hopes of enhancing the
chances of a life verdict, the decision cannot be deemed a "mitigation waiver." Evaluation of that
strategic or tactical decision is properly governed by the well-developed body of law springing from
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,390-98 (2000). But
there is a distinction between presenting no defense and presenting no evidence in support of a
defense. A mitigation waiver, as I use the term, means the former, a veto over a mitigation
presentation that constitutes an abandonment of the adversarial process, not a considered judgment
over how best to take advantage of it. A mitigation waiver, in short, is a decision not to enhance the
chances of securing a life verdict in lieu of a death sentence, but one made to accomplish the opposite.
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to do its job? How, that is, can the jury arrive at a "reasoned moral"
judgment about whether this human being should live or die?7 Surely
reliability in capital sentencing is no mere precatory aspiration for the
sake of the defendant. With the sovereign right to execute as society's
response to certain crimes, the state must ensure, as a compelling interest
of its own, that the sentencing jury considers available mitigation
evidence so it can, with appropriate moral judgment, decide the suitable
sentence. The legitimacy of lethal punishment in fact depends upon it.
So, though unquestionably true that the Constitution preserves the
defendant's freedom to choose how best to handle his own case,8 our
judge can see that relying on the paradigm of free choice lops off one half
of the equation: the sovereign's own interest in ensuring capital
punishment's fair and reliable application. And she understands how
deep that interest runs, for "taking the life of one of its citizens" is the
ultimate sovereign act-the most extraordinary exercise of state power.9
It is a powerful intuition, this sense that a convicted capital
defendant ought not be allowed to subvert the process in this
fundamental way. But it runs headlong into that compelling intuition that
more is at stake for the defendant than just preserving his right to control
his case, that on the other side of the ledger is not just a legal right, that
at bottom there is the powerful but murky notion of dignity, and
associated with it, that slippery constitutional notion of the "right to be
let alone."'" The defendant may lose his life at the end of this juridical
journey, but can we take away this remnant of his dignity to control his
own personal destiny and thus to decide for himself that he does not
want what is likely to be shameful facts about his life to be laid bare
before the jury? Doesn't it all come down to respect for autonomy?
Let us call it the Autonomy Ideal, our judge's intuition about the
defendant's right to control his own case and his dignity interest in not
having the state force him on a course of action that might well deeply
repulse him." And let us call the countervailing intuition the Reliability
Ideal. Our commitment to it is why the law governing killing-as-
punishment is so complex and elaborate, byzantine even. The integrity of
the capital-sentencing process demands the sovereign's commitment to
7. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,319 (1989).
8. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34.
9. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,358 (1977).
io. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478.(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
i t. Perhaps the best expression of the Autonomy Ideal in the criminal law is Faretta v. California,
where the Supreme Court understood the right to self-representation to be an expression of "'respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."' 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-51 (970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant
Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621, 653 (2005) (observing that a "few [commentators] have gone so far as
to argue that Faretta represents the apex of the [Supreme] Court's respect for individual autonomy").
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ensure that execution is reserved only for the truly worthy.'" More than
an aspiration, this is an irrevocable mandate under the Eighth
Amendment.'
3
Our judge has to decide, it seems, between these two colliding ideals,
autonomy versus reliability. Her research will reveal that in every
jurisdiction except two-Florida and New Jersey-the former trumps the
latter.'4 We can hardly find that surprising, since the Autonomy Ideal is
entrenched not only in our legal culture-it is, after all, "the lifeblood of
the law"' 5-but is sunk deep in our collective psyche. And that is why, we
tend to say to ourselves, the entire trajectory of constitutional criminal
procedure has been not only to favor the choice of waiving enforcement
of constitutional rights, but to encourage it.'6 Even the most dubious
"choice" to waive enforcement of a constitutional right is often regarded
as a worthy expression of autonomy.'7 So the prevailing wisdom is that
the Autonomy Ideal is very strong, even sacrosanct, rendering
anachronistic the notion of barring a waiver of a constitutional right, 8
rendering it at best a quaint sentiment cutting against the grain of
twentieth-century doctrinal development in constitutional criminal
procedure."
Commentators have struggled over this seeming collision of the
Autonomy and Reliability Ideals." But what has never been questioned
12. The principle can be stated clearly, though the nuances of the doctrine remain perplexing, if
not contradictory: the crime alone, though it renders the defendant eligible for the death penalty,
cannot be the sole basis for deciding that the defendant ought to get the death penalty (i.e., worthy of
the death penalty). See generally Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (0978); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
13. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-05.
14. See Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 361-62 (Fla. 2ooi), cert. denied, Florida v.
Muhammad, 534 U.S. 944 (2001); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 995,997 (N.J. 1988).
15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 834 (1975). See generally HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMrrS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 65 (1968); Hugh Gibbons, Justifying Law: An Explanation of the Deep
Structure of American Law, 3 LAW & PHIL. 165 (1984) (autonomy at the root of American legal
discourse).
I6. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) (stating that the "community has a
real interest in encouraging consent [to search]"). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4.02 (3d ed. 2002).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (consent searches "reinforce[] the
rule of law"); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,155 (990) ("Both waiver of rights and admission of
guilt are consistent with the affirmation of individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal
justice system.").
18. See Hopt v. Utah, IIO U.S. 574, 579 (1884) (disallowing defendant's waiver of presence). See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 211 (1979)
(recounting how judges used to discourage guilty pleas).
19. See Toone, supra note I I, at 646-47.
20. See generally Bonnie, supra note 4; Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity in Capital
Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant
Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REV. 95 (1987); Christy Chandler, Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN. L.
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is the premise to the debate, that what is at stake is this collision between
autonomy and reliability. I intend to show that framing the analysis this
way blinds us to three things. One, it overlooks how the unique nature of
the cruel-and-unusual-punishments clause calls for a different, stricter
understanding of waiver in the Eighth Amendment context than in other
constitutional contexts. Two, it obscures what we mean when we speak of
autonomy, obscures even the fact that we may mean nothing substantial
at all. And three, it discourages a reevaluation of the important question,
what exactly is the function of mitigation, and does that function imply that
the state has an interest in something beyond the procedural guarantee that
the capital defendant may present unimpeded whatever mitigation he
chooses to present?
On a broader thematic scale, I want to explore the thesis that the
power of autonomy as an ideal resides in what we associate it with, not in
how we might conceptualize it metaphysically. In that sense, autonomy is
a slogan; indeed, a perfect slogan. It is a slogan because it appeals to us
intuitively while being neither a precise nor static term. It is perfect
because it captures a deep moral sensibility about what is properly
valued in our criminal justice system. Our understanding of it necessarily
derives from its use, watching it in action, if you will, seeing it used to
justify normative claims and punitive actions, seeing how it connects and
interplays with other loaded concepts, like freedom and dignity and
responsibility. So the Autonomy Ideal is amorphous enough, interwoven
tightly enough with other amorphous and grandiose notions, to be a
powerful slogan." And like all slogans, it masks more than it reveals. I
want to focus on the mitigation-waiver conundrum not to suggest any
REV. I897 (I998). Julie Levinsohn Milner, Dignity or Death Row: Are Death Row Rights to Die
Diminished? A Comparison of the Right to Die for the Terminally Ill and the Terminally Sentenced, 24
NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 279 (1998); G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution:
Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 86o (1983); Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned
Prisoners, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553 (1984); Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution,
48 U. PITr. L. REV. 853 (1987); Kathleen L. Johnson, Note, The Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or
Intimate Decision? 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 575 (i98i). Much of this scholarly literature is devoted to a form
of death-volunteering that I do not consider in this Article-namely, death-row inmates who wish to
abandon further litigation and submit to execution. The Supreme Court has never been receptive to
the argument that this form of volunteering is constitutionally troublesome. See generally
Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731 (5990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (199o); Hammett v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 725 (198o) (per curiam); Lenhard v. Wolf, 444 U.S. 8o7 (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012 (1976). The Court has never addressed head-on the issue of whether a capital defendant
may volunteer for execution at the adjudicatory stage by vetoing a mitigation presentation. It has,
however, addressed other issues involving such capital defendants. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 398 (1993); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 307 n.4 (199o).
21. See Robert Young, Autonomy and the "Inner Self," in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 77 (John Christman ed., 1989) (stating that "for all its importance and despite
the frequency with which it is appealed to, the concept of autonomy generally operates at an intuitive
level and rarely is seriously explored").
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
particular doctrinal program or to criticize judicial action, but to see one
instance of how a rhetorical device masks how we should understand jury
decisionmaking in capital prosecution.
The discussion will proceed as follows. Part I highlights how the
Autonomy-Reliability dichotomy frames the mitigation-waiver analysis
and how that framing leads us into an analytical cul-de-sac. Part II points
to a different analytical path by showing why the law's penchant for
accepting, and even encouraging, waivers of constitutional rights does
not support the view that we ought to accept competent waivers of the
right to present mitigation evidence. This discussion is intended to
expose the notion of autonomy to be more "rhetorical flourish," an
"illusion," than meaningful notion, as one commentator justifiably put it
in the context of re-evaluating the wisdom of Faretta."2 Part III gets to the
heart of the matter, the unexplored facet of this issue. It questions the
conventional understanding of mitigation evidence as a mercy-inducing
device, a way to engender mercy for the capital defendant, thereby
overcoming the jury's finding that he is eligible and thus deserving of
death. This reexamination of mitigation's function is crucial to
understanding why empowering capital defendants to veto in toto a
mitigation presentation is fundamentally wrong.
My claim is this: The function of mitigation is far more profound
than just provoking merciful sentiments. If mitigation's function, in its
essence, serves to trigger the merciful impulses of the capital jury, then
that fact strengthens the view that empowering capital defendants to veto
a mitigation presentation is just another instance of our culture's
honoring autonomy. But, I argue, an effective mitigation presentation
introduces into the decisional mix matters that the capital defendant
ought have no power to veto, ideas and sentiments of collective
responsibility and guilt, considerations that deepen the concept of
autonomy and thus enrich the moral nature of the jury's decisionmaking.
While we applaud ourselves with the thought that our impulse to permit
waivers of constitutional rights evinces our commitment to autonomy as
a social good and collective virtue, the truth is that a meaningful inquiry
into autonomy, through evidence of mitigation, is most essential in the
capital-punishment context, where the jury must determine whether the
"unique[] ... individual,"23 under the decisional glare of the jurors, ought
to die for his crime.
We may receive a collateral benefit in this reexamination, apart from
breaking through the conundrum of the mitigation-waiver issue. We may
gain a heightened awareness of how autonomy becomes in a capital trial
more than a mere slogan that rhetorically supports the moral
22. Toone, supra note i i, at 623, 655.
23. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 6o5 (1978).
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infrastructure of the criminal law. We may become more attuned to the
reality-and thus more open to discussing-that matters of collective
responsibility, and even of collective guilt, inform criminal-law
adjudication, even as we insist that the enterprise of punishment is
quintessentially an exercise in assigning individual blame.
I. THE FALSE AUTONOMY-RELIABILITY DICHOTOMY
Commentators disagree on whether a capital defendant should be
allowed to veto a mitigation presentation in the penalty phase.24 What
they agree on are three things: (I) a capital sentencing jury must consider
mitigation evidence presented at trial, (2) a capital defendant cannot be
impeded in presenting mitigation evidence, whether by evidentiary
ruling, prosecutorial misconduct, or defense counsel's dereliction, and (3)
a mitigation waiver involves the collision between the Autonomy Ideal
and the Reliability Ideal. They may even agree on a fourth proposition,
that because "death is... different," 5 what is legitimate or countenanced
in a non-capital context does not perforce mean that the action or
judgment is permitted or countenanced when death is a possible
punishment.
The death-is-different theme is the main argumentative platform for
those who advocate against capitulating to a capital defendant's
purported desire to veto a mitigation presentation.26 This or some other
distinguishing feature of capital jurisprudence is essential here because
the general ethical rule is quite plain: "the lawyer should always
remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives
or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and
not for himself."27 Anti-waiver advocates, as I shall call them, pursue the
claim that "[p]ermitting a defendant to waive or forego the presentation
of mitigating evidence defeats the public's interest [in reliable capital
sentencing] inherent in the eighth amendment. ' s They argue that
limiting a defendant's right to waive constitutional protections is
appropriate when society's interest in systemic integrity of the judicial
process outweighs the countervailing autonomy interests. 9 The fact-value
leap, the jump from is to ought, is undertaken with unshakeable
confidence: because "death is different," because mitigation evidence is
so vital to reliable capital sentencing, because society's interest in
24. See supra notes 4, 20.
25. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 0976).
26. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 20, at iio; Strafer, supra note 2o, at 876-85.
27. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (198o); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (r983) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.., and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
28. Carter, supra note 20, at 127-28.
29. Id. at 127.
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limiting executions to the truly death worthy is so immense, a defendant
ought not be allowed to veto a mitigation presentation.
This line of thought, seductive as it is at first glance, is pure question-
begging. What process does the Reliability Ideal demand? Indeed, what
do we mean by "reliable" capital sentencing, when all agree it is
impossible to articulate a neutral standard by which to say that a
particular capital sentencing judgment is right or wrong? And if we
cannot say what we mean by "reliable," then how can we say with any
precision what society's reliability interest actually is? Why must the
Reliability Ideal be vindicated by nothing short of forcing a mitigation
presentation on someone who doesn't want it?3"
Anti-waiver advocates assume without proving that the Reliability
Ideal is vindicated only when a mitigation presentation is actually made.
This is a contested point, and thus must be argued for. True, the societal
interest in sentencing reliability is immense; true, also, a capital-
sentencing jury must consider available mitigation evidence as part of its
Eighth Amendment function. But these uncontested propositions, in
themselves, do not prove that the Reliability Ideal trumps the Autonomy
Ideal. Nor does the death-is-different mantra dictate that every legal
issue implicating the reliability of the sentencing process will be decided
only and always to enhance reliability.' There is an inadequately argued
fact-value leap, a leap from the is (society has a reliability interest) to the
ought (mitigation evidence ought to be presented to the jury, no matter
what a capital defendant may desire). Put another way, that mitigation is
indisputably important in capital decisionmaking does not mean it is
necessary in a legal or constitutional sense (a value that is precisely at
issue in the mitigation-waiver controversy). Exposing the illegitimate
fact-value leap highlights why the anti-waiver argument, as typically
articulated, amounts to an opinion, a subjective weighing of the
competing ideals that gives inadequate regard to the dignity interests of
the capital defendant.32
Consider in this light the Ohio Supreme Court decision of State v.
30. In considering these questions, we must remember that the capital defendant's veto of
mitigation does not amount to dispensing with the penalty-phase process itself, or of the jury's
assessment of the facts of the crime (the aggravating factors) and whatever mitigating circumstances
that might surface within that assessment (including observations of the defendant and his supporters
in the courtroom-not an incidental consideration, as any skilled capital defense lawyer knows), or its
deliberation over the question of life imprisonment or death after hearing instructions from the trial
judge. The capital defendant's veto of mitigation does not amount to dispensing with the State's
obligation to prove that the defendant is indeed qualified under the law to be executed.
31. For two notorious examples that prove the truth of this fact, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987), and Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
32. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1376-77 (arguing that the "prisoner's dignity stands against the
dignity of the law").
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Ashworth.33 The defendant there pled guilty to capital murder and
"waive[d] the presentation of mitigating evidence so that he would be
executed."34 On appeal, the defendant argued that he should not have
been allowed to waive mitigation because Ohio's capital statute and the
Eighth Amendment mandate that the jury consider mitigation evidence.35
The court agreed with the anti-waiver proponents' cardinal principle that
society has a weighty interest in reliable capital sentencing. But that
interest, the court reasoned, is vindicated by a process that adequately
winnows out those who are not qualified to receive the death penalty.
6
And so, when the defendant chose not to avail himself of the opportunity
the Ohio statute and the Eighth Amendment granted him, he was doing
nothing more than exercising his autonomy, not undercutting the state's
reliability interest. To suggest otherwise, as the anti-waiver proponents
do, is to posit without offering the necessary justificatory arguments that
the state's reliability interest necessarily entails something more than
holding a fair trial where both the defendant's qualification to receive the
death penalty is reliably determined and the defendant's opportunity to
present evidence showing why death nonetheless ought not be imposed is
unimpeded.
The validity of what I will call "the Ashworth thesis" is nourished by
two sources of thought. First, that waivers of constitutional rights are
more than tolerated in our legal culture; they are emphatically
encouraged as an expression of our culture's reverence for the
Autonomy Ideal. And second, mitigation functions as a device to
engender mercy. Under this understanding of mitigation's function, the
decision whether to advocate for life in the penalty phase does not
implicate the sovereign's independent reliability interest, but only the
individual's personal prerogative to seek mercy-a matter ripe for waiver
in our legal culture of flourishing waivers.
But is it true that our flourishing waiver doctrine expresses our
commitment to the ideal of autonomy? And is it true that in its essence
mitigation functions chiefly as a means to evoke from the jury a merciful
sentiment so strong that it will spare the life of the defendant. To these
questions, in that order, we now turn.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF WAIVER
Tied to our philosophical fidelity to the Autonomy Ideal, the
impetus for permitting capital defendants to waive mitigation, is the
33. 7o6 N.E.2d 1231 (Ohio 1999).
34- Id. at 1235.
35. Id. at 1236-37.
36. Id. at 1238 ("'[Rjequired reliability is attained when the prosecution has discharged its burden
of proof at the trial and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and within the guidelines of a
constitutional death penalty statute .... ').
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indisputable fact that waivers of constitutional rights are commonplace.37
You are free to say thanks, but no thanks to the most basic and precious
of constitutional rights. You may insist on your right to privacy but
decide to let the government search your car, your luggage, your home,
even your body. You may insist on your.right to silence but nonetheless
choose to explain in elaborate detail how you in fact committed the
horrible crime that the detectives suspect you of committing. You may
forego opportunities to testify at your trial, cross-examine witnesses,
object to evidence, argue points of law to the judge and matters of fact to
the jury; you and your lawyer may sit mute as the prosecution mounts a
case against you. You may even consent to an adjudication of guilt
without the ritual of trial, a waiver of a medley of rights.
We live in a legal culture where waivers of constitutional rights
flourish even though society must remain committed to enforcing those
rights. Indeed, waiver itself can be treated as a right in itself, one among
the positive constitutional rights associated with the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments. 8 Society's enforcement obligations, in many
respects, hinge on the individual's choice to invoke those rights. That we
as a society benefit from waiver decisions, or at least are not diminished
by them, reinforces the utilitarian analysis to allow them without much
hand-wringing. You need only think of plea bargains to see the point.
The system would collapse if this did not happen routinely.
We allow waivers to permit what would otherwise be
unconstitutional governmental action because, we like to tell ourselves,
the preeminent value we place on the power to choose demands that "we
permit our citizens to choose whether or not they wish to exercise their
constitutional rights."39 Without contradiction, then, a flourishing waiver
doctrine coexists within a legal system that openly commits itself to
enforcing constitutional rights. And at the heart of this coexistence is the
notion of autonomy.
A. THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY
The ideal of autonomy, we have seen, drives the mitigation-waiver
analysis. That ideal is expressed in our talk of free choice, dignity, control
over personal decisions, control over one's life or fate or destiny-
locutions that define the way we think about the mitigation-waiver
conundrum. These locutions define the way we think about mitigation
waiver because we treat the decision to veto a mitigation presentation as
a form of consent, and the concept of consent gains its justificatory power
37. See generally DRESSLER, supra note I6, at § 4.02 ("Virtually any constitutional right may be
waived by a criminal suspect or defendant during a criminal investigation or prosecution.").
38. The Faretta right of self-representation is a prime example, as is the right not to testify. Both
involve waivers of rights.
39. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (I973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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by its association with the ideal of autonomy and the moral foundations
of human dignity.0 And yet very little is offered to elucidate what the
concept of autonomy means.4'
Autonomy, for present purposes, is expressed in three interrelated
ways: the power to waive rights, the power to control one's own destiny,
and the power to insist on being left alone. I say interrelated because
often these are compressed as a single idea: the power to waive can be
understood as a manifestation of the power to control one's own destiny,
and the power to control one's own destiny implies a zone of privacy
where one is entitled to be left alone, free of government intrusion. I will
later disentangle these three expressions of autonomy to better
understand the doctrinal underpinnings to the mitigation-waiver debate.
But for now, suffice it to say that they are powerful notions, and the
Court in Faretta was right to observe that free choice-a phrase designed
to capture the essence of what we mean by autonomy-is "the lifeblood
of the law."'
i. Autonomy in Action: A Case Study
Perhaps the best exemplar of the compression of these three
expressions of autonomy is the Faretta doctrine. A defendant's request
for self-representation under Faretta entails a waiver of the right to
counsel; that waiver is justified by a constitutional interpretation of the
Sixth Amendment that the fundamental rights associated with defending
against criminal accusations are personal to the defendant-personal,
because presumptively innocent defendants, like all free persons, have an
autonomy right to control their own case-and the foisting of unwanted
counsel upon defendants who wish to waive their right to counsel
intrudes upon a private realm of the individual that must be protected to
give meaning to the autonomy right to control not just one's own court
case, but by extension, one's own destiny.
To see how much traction these ideas have in the mitigation-waiver
context, let us look at the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Davis,43 perhaps the most illuminating mitigation-waiver decision in this
regard, since it forthrightly reasons that presenting a mitigation case over
a defendant's objection paternalistically interferes with individual
autonomy.44 There, the trial judge allowed the capital defendant to
40. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900-01, 939 (1994)
(noting how consent is understood as promoting autonomy and expresses the "primacy of
individualistic values in our culture").
41. See Young, supra note 21, at 77 (noting that the notion of autonomy remains largely
"unexplored").
42. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
43. 285 F.3 d 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
44. Many courts avoid the mitigation-waiver conundrum by packaging the issue as simply a
question of effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Roberts v. Dretke, 381 F.3d 491, 499-500 (5th Cir.
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advocate for his own death, but appointed independent counsel -amicus
counsel-to present the best mitigation case possible, with due account
for the difficulties and impediments arising from the defendant's pro-
death position.' The Fifth Circuit on interlocutory appeal reversed the
trial judge's ruling, holding that the involvement of amicus counsel
advocating for a life sentence violates the Faretta doctrine because it
would impermissibly undercut the defendant's personal desire to achieve
his aim of receiving a death verdict. 46
What is illuminating in the Davis opinion is the shallow acceptance
of autonomy as an animating ideal. The power of that ideal overwhelmed
what should have been obvious. The right to self-representation derives
from the right to fashion one's own defense, something Mr. Davis could
do. The amicus solution that the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent
with Faretta in no way foisted onto Mr. Davis an unwanted defense or
litigation posture. Mr. Davis was free during the penalty-phase
proceeding to press vigorously for his pro-death position, and he could
use his unfettered autonomy to denounce amicus counsel from start to
finish. The amicus solution simply paved the way for another point of
view to be presented in the penalty phase, one that the jury would
undoubtedly benefit hearing from. Faretta does not entail the right to
silence alternative points of view that the law deems worthy, if not
essential, for consideration. By confusing the defendant's ability to
control his own case with the separate question whether any evidence
should be presented in a penalty trial-a question that is preeminently
one of public policy as embodied in constitutional construction and not
subject to the personal whim of a convicted capital defendant-the Davis
court's reasoning effectively allows the pro se defendant to wrest control
from the state in its effort to ensure reliable capital sentencing.
Furthermore, the autonomy justification for recognizing the right to
self-representation is not, in itself, evidence of its weight as a positive
virtue. It remains a highly disfavored doctrine. We see this most clearly
when we compare it to the primary right to be represented by counsel. A
suspect must be told, before being interrogated, that he has a right to
counsel, and if he invokes the right to counsel, all questioninF must
cease.47 If he is charged, he is automatically entitled to counsel.4 But a
person need not be told of his right to represent himself. He could go
2004); Singleton v. Lochhart, 962 F.2d 1315, 1322 (8th Cir. 1992); Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F.2d 358,
361-62 (5th Cir. 1984); Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Zagorski v. State, 983
S.W.2d 654,657-59 (Tenn. 1998).
45. Davis, 285 F.3 d at 38o. Professor Carter advocates this amicus solution. See Carter, supra note
20, at 149.
46. 285 F.3d at 384-85.
47. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981).
48. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
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through the entire criminal process without once being apprised of his
right to self-representation. Indeed, under Faretta, a trial court should
discourage the exercise of the right to self-representation by warning the
defendant of the pitfalls of self-representation.49 Such discouragement is
unthinkable when it comes to the right to counsel. Moreover, while it is
easy to lose your right to self-representation, it is hard to imagine how
one could lose the right to counsel, short of asserting a valid waiver. The
right to counsel is part of the structural guarantee of the criminal process;
the right to self-representation is an anomaly in the process that we
grudgingly accept.
This means that the right to counsel is paramount to the right to
proceed pro se. And here is what is significant about that. The right to
counsel is rooted in the sovereign's overarching interest in reliable
outcomes, not in vindicating some personal interest of the defendant."
So, within the very structure of the Sixth Amendment there is a decided
tilt towards the sovereign's independent interest in reliable outcomes."
Properly understood, the Faretta right gives a defendant the ability to
control his own case within the parameters of the adversarial process. A
defendant cannot use the Faretta right to undermine or make a mockery
of the adversarial process. After all, Faretta derives from the Sixth
Amendment; it would be odd to allow a right flowing from the Sixth
Amendment to be used to undercut the overarching purpose of the Sixth
Amendment, which is the preservation of the adversarial process. When
a capital defendant is allowed to waive mitigation in the spirit of Faretta,
that defendant is using a Sixth Amendment doctrine to make a mockery
of the adversarial process by sabotaging it.
The superficial thinking in Davis epitomizes the enormous power
the Autonomy Ideal has on the legal mind. The rhetoric of autonomy is
so powerful, so seductive, that framing the issue as one involving a waiver
or consent ineluctably leads us down a path of empowering the capital
defendant to veto a mitigation presentation. The trajectory of the law, for
over a hundred years, has been to allow defendants to waive their rights,
and that allowance fits comfortably within our socio-political and cultural
ideas about free choice, control of one's destiny, and autonomy
generally. So, to suggest that defendants may not waive procedural
rights, that they will be enforced against their will, is to paddle upstream
on a mighty river. And this is particularly true when we add in the fact
49. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (975); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938)
(stating the trial judge has "serious and weighty responsibility" to protect against improvident waiver
of counsel).
50. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
51. This tilt comes to the fore in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., where the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to self-representation on appeal, in
part because the defendant is no longer presumed innocent. 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2oo0).
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that the purported choice to veto a mitigation presentation derives from
the highly personal, if not sacred, determination of the worth of one's
own life and how, given the constraining circumstances, one would prefer
to live it.
But once we scrutinize the concept of autonomy, rather than deploy
it rhetorically, we can see that it holds far less power in the mitigation-
waiver analysis. Analyzing the law's rapid and expansive embrace of
waiver, we see that wrapping waiver in the philosophical garb of
autonomy is a myth-in this context, a myth in the service of suppressing
destabilizing conversations about capital jurisprudence, and as we shall
ultimately see, about individualized versus collective responsibility and
guilt.
2. A Short Discourse on Autonomy
The value we place on autonomy has never been grounded in
simplistic utilitarian arguments of who is in the best position to evaluate
and choose what course of action an individual might take. 2 Autonomy
has value not because we have evaluated who is best to decide personal
matters; autonomy has value because we regard the choosing itself as
crucial to our being in the world, our connectedness to social life.53
Choosing is integral to dignity, and to deny choice to another regarding
matters of personal concern risks denying the other the status of person.4
Let us unpack this intuition.
Its literal meaning evokes its implications: autonomy literally means
self-governance, a word derived from the Greek, self and law or rule.'s
Self-governance has always been an integral part, if not the core notion,
in any sophisticated understanding of autonomy. 6 Sometimes this core
notion is used only as an ideal type to defend the existence of what I call
52. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS 154-57 (2002); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION, 222-25 (993).
53. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 52, at 135 ("[T]he ideal of autonomy, as commonly understood, is
bound up with the idea of choice.").
54. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, 98-io8 (Harper
Torchbooks, H.J. Paton trans. 1948) [hereinafter, KANT, GROUNDWORK]. The philosophical conception
of the person as a being who chooses is an essential harmonizing idea in American jurisprudence. See,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (I980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (1977); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 8-9 (1978); RICHARD POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-115 (I98i). But see DAN-COHEN, supra note 52, at 125-45 (arguing that
autonomy is more about "willing" than about "choosing").
55. See LAWRENCE HAWORTH, AUTONOMY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ETHICS
I 1 (1986).
56. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at 98-io2. To Kant, the will is a lawgiver, for the
"[i]dea of the will of every rational being [is] ... a will which makes universal law." Id. at 99; see also
id. at too (the rational agent is "subject only to laws which are made by himself and yet are universal").
True morality, therefore, is a form of self-governance. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 52, at 135.
Individual autonomy is, in fact, a political metaphor, as the concept of autonomy was most likely
originally applied to states and institutions. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF, ch. 18 (1986).
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an immunity zone, a space for the individual to make choices free from
governmental intrusion. The idea is that an immunity zone allows for the
exercise of individual self-governance. Autonomy as an immunity zone is
important insofar as it promotes the psychological conditions for self-
governance.
Within the immunity zone is where preferences are formed. And
preferences can reflect what philosophers call lower- and higher-order
desires (sometimes phrased as first- and second- and third-order
preferences, and so on).57 A lower-order desire is the desire to do
something-say, the desire to smoke a cigarette. It is the most concrete
form of desire. A higher-order desire is the desire to desire something,
wanting what you want. Our smoker who would like to quit, then, would
have a conflict between the lower- and higher-order desires: she wants a
cigarette, but she doesn't want to want it. She'd prefer not to have that
desire. This distinction, even in its simplistic form as presented here,
introduces the important idea of authenticity. Authenticity is the process
of identifying one's desires and endorsing them." Our smoker's
autonomy is inauthentic when it comes to smoking because the first-
order desire, as real and compelling as it is at the level of psychology, is
not endorsed by the smoker's deeper self. The deeper, more reflective
self-that part of the human personality that reflects upon and chooses
to endorse or not endorse as desirable the more immediate desires-is at
war with the desiring self. The aspiration for true self-governance
involves the aspiration to merge lower- and higher-order desires. This is
an aspiration for authenticity.59 For when you want what you want, when
your immediate desires harmonize with your deeper, reflective self, you
are living authentically. 6°
Authenticity leads us to notions of freedom. Freedom and
autonomy, though not the same, are closely interrelated. They are closely
57. See generally Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in THE
INNER CITADEL, supra note 2 1, at 63-74.
58. See generally Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note
21, at 59; Henry Frankfurt, Identification and Externality, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE
ABOUT (1988).
59. See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHics OF AUTHENTICITY 25-29 (1992). The way Kant speaks of
autonomy harmonizes with this linkage to authenticity. He argues that his Categorical Imperative-
the imperative to act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law
of nature-is not merely a command to follow a universal law based in pure reason, but to follow a
universal law which we ourselves make as rational agents and one which we ourselves particularize
through our maxims. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at 98-99. To Kant, morality is an expression
of our true selves-in my locution, our authentic selves-as rational agents. Id. See Young, supra note
24, at 78-79.
6o. See TAYLOR, supra note 59, at 25-29. Taylor says that the pursuit of authenticity "accords
crucial moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own inner nature . I..." d  at 29.
That "inner nature"-inner voice, if you will-is perennially threatened by pressures for conformity
and capitulation, forces that squelch one's "capacity to listen to this inner voice." Id.
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interrelated because of the importance of authenticity to any
sophisticated understanding of autonomy. The effort to merge lower-
and higher-order desires is a process of the deeper, reflective self
identifying with its desires, taking ownership of them, turning them into
ingredients of one's identity as a person. Authenticity, understood this
way, implies, at the very least, that this process of identifying with one's
desires is uncoerced. Any adequate notion of freedom and autonomy
must recognize not just the freedom to do what one wants (freedom to
smoke), but also being able to want what one wants (power of self-
governance). So, autonomy in its structural aspect, in the way it brings
together notions of authenticity and freedom, necessarily entails both a
view about how a person must regard her preferences and a concern for
how those preferences are formed.
We should bring into the open one other aspect to the structural
understanding of autonomy. If we understand authenticity to involve the
harmonizing of lower- and higher-order desires, then we must include in
our understanding of autonomy not just freedom but evaluation as well.6'
For self-governance, understood as a process of harmonizing lower- and
higher-order desires, requires evaluating those desires. And evaluation
implies the capacity to disentangle the different levels of desire. The
general idea is that the state has greater prerogatives in intruding into the
immunity zone when the capacity of the individual is diminished. And it
is in that sense that competency as a legal concept is a device for
allocating power not among individuals within a judicial proceeding, but
an allocation of power between the individual and the state.
This structural understanding of autonomy-autonomy as built upon
the idea of authenticity, freedom, and capacity for evaluation-leads
towards an investigation into one view of why life is sacred. Authenticity
and freedom imbue autonomy with a robust meaning because they speak
to the formation of preferences and desires from a rational (not
necessarily wise) uncoerced, self-reflective vision of one's life as a
thematic unity. Authenticity and freedom-and hence, autonomy-
suggest a pursuit of coherence, of integrity in one's character and life. It
is in that sense that autonomy implies connectedness, an individual's
sense of feeling connected to the collective, to the family, the community,
the society at large.2 We understand this as a matter of intuition. That is
61. Cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE II9 (1986) (noting the limits of an individual's
capacity for evaluation); ROBERT NozICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 140-41 (1993) (specifying
conditions for rational preference formation, thus implying a standard of self-critical evaluation as a
condition for autonomous activity).
62. Cf. Susan Wolf, Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra
note 21, at 144-45 (discussing sanity, and the desire to be sane, as desiring "that one's self be
connected to the world in a certain way," and positing that connectedness to the real world is what
legitimates the idea of responsibility).
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why we are inclined to say that when one acts out of character, that
person is being inauthentic, phony, not real, and in more extreme cases,
regarded as disconnected from reality. That is why quality novelists and
movie-makers and storytellers obsess over the integrity of each scene-a
false move by a character, a discordant utterance, and the carefully
crafted fictional dream has burst. That is why we put such a premium in a
free society on the ideal of freedom of conscience: freedom of conscience
is the freedom to author one's own life, the opportunity to be authentic,
and thus the opportunity to be autonomous. That is why we remove from
the criminal justice apparatus the criminal acts of the insane: those acts,
we believe, do not express the character of the actor; they are acts
perpetrated by persons who are disconnected from the real world and
thus by persons who are not autonomous.
To be autonomous. We have moved from a static notion to a
dynamic one. Autonomy is not just an ascriptive attribute, a right to be
let alone. It is not simply a notion that calls to mind a barrier between the
individual and the state-an immunity zone, as I have called it. It is an
aspiration that speaks to what it means to be human: it speaks to the
importance of connectedness, the entwining of the self and the collective;
it speaks to what we mean when we say that life is sacred; it speaks to
why we feel more than just irked when there is an intrusion into our
ability to choose how best to author our own lives, why we feel in such
instances personally violated, why we regard as under assault our very
personhood. We have a dynamic notion because autonomy is about
navigation, not about status. We are not merely autonomous beings. We
grow into it, navigate towards it, in a world of powerful forces.
Life, of course, does not always permit freedom to do what one
wants. It would be empirically vacuous to equate freedom and autonomy.
The healthy individual's acquisition of greater and greater responsibility
as he or she moves through adolescence into adulthood cultivates the
capacity and the freedom to navigate through life, through the various
institutional, social, political, circumstantial forces that are often beyond
the individual's immediate control. The sacredness of the navigation
resides in the importance it bears in bringing thematic unity, coherence,
and integrity to living.
And so we come to dignity. For what else is this right to live in such a
way? What else do we call an intrusion into the ability to author one's
life but an assault on dignity? To link autonomy and dignity in this way is
to embrace a vision of the autonomous self as mutable, revisable, subject
to change and refinement through grace, reflection, and critique. If the
self is nothing more than a brute fact, one's attributes and characteristics
(one's character) implanted in the individual, then it would make no
sense to speak of autonomy in the dynamic sense suggested here. We
could speak of freedom, but our talk of dignity would be corrupted. It is
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precisely in our understanding of the self as not a brute fact, but more
akin to an aesthetic presentation to the world, that allows us to speak so
honorifically about autonomy, to link it so tightly with dignity, almost to
the point where the terms become in legal analysis interchangeable. But
as we shall see, when we discuss in more detail what is meant by
"mitigation" in capital punishment litigation, this aesthetic quality of the
self forces us to embrace the importance of capacity to evaluate whether
how we are is how we want to be.
3
We value autonomy, then, because it elevates us above the vacuity
of mere freedom to do what we want to do as a first-order desire.
Freedom to act does not compel us to get beyond first-order desires, and
for that reason it cannot accord us with the sort of human dignity that we
insist upon. A robust understanding of autonomy does that: it forces us
to go into second- and third-order desires, and beyond; it forces us to
acknowledge the evaluative process that the self must engage in, which in
turn draws us into the notion of a deeper self; and that deeper self is one
that arises from an engagement with the world, a connectedness to the
collective. This injection into our thinking of the self's connectedness to
the collective is what allows us to see why dignity must not be wedded to
some mythic idea of the isolated self. There is something here that is
worth exploring about the criminal process. Autonomy, not just
intentionality or freedom of the will, is key to understanding the criminal
justice process because punishment is more than just inflicting pain and
stripping liberty for an abuse of freedom, for the unjustified seizing of
advantage outside the rules of civil society; punishment is justified
because the perpetrator has expressed his character, something that is
beyond a mere psychological state. It is autonomy, not mere freedom of
the will-autonomy that contains within it the idea of the self's
connectedness to the collective-that gives moral justification to
punishment. And that is why autonomy-the key idea to individual
responsibility and guilt -ultimately opens up the notion of collective
responsibility and guilt, which will prove crucial to our reconceptualizing
mitigation.
But for the moment, let us be content to observe that with this aerial
view of the concept of autonomy we have no difficulty seeing how and
63. This leap from is to ought-the leap from how we are to how we want to be-accords with our
intuitions because we do in fact place greater value in actions that spring from desires rooted in
rationally-arrived at values than those that are not. This means that autonomy in its most meaningful
sense is preference-formation derived from values reflectively conceived, as opposed to implanted or
inherited, and thus central to aesthetic integrity in life-which is to say, integrity-in-action, understood
as a commitment to one's values. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 52, at I35; DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION,
supra note 52, at 224. Religious traditions build on this aesthetic understanding of life, and in that
limited sense, autonomy as an ideal is virtually universal.
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why autonomy is regarded as the "lifeblood of the law" 64 and why we
revere the notion-why we get opinions like Davis; why, indeed, the
notion gets imported into an analysis of mitigation waiver and literally
overpowers the countervailing incentive to maximize the reliability of the
capital-sentencing process.
B. WAIVER AND CONSENT; CONSENT AND AUTONOMY
Consent and waiver might be seen as flipsides of the same coin.5
Though I regard this observation as too simplistic, it at least captures
what I regard as important for present purposes, that waiving a
constitutional right means consenting to a particular legal state of
affairs. 66 When we speak of consent, we are speaking of one of three
things: (i) a subjective condition, a state of mind, an internal attitude
towards some event or state of affairs; (2) a granting of permission, an
expression of acquiescence or willingness for some event to occur or
some state of affairs to come about; or (3) a combination of these two. In
what sense we use the term consent depends on the function we want it
to serve.67
The function of consent in the context of mitigation waivers requires
that we speak of it in the second sense, as a form of expression, which is
to say, a granting of permission.68 Consent-as-permission (the expression
of consent) is significant Rrecisely because, in a legal context, it performs
a kind of "moral magic." When an expressive act of granting permission
64. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51
(I97o) (Brennan, J. concurring)).
65. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (voluntary consent sometimes
understood as a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights).
66. We must put to one side the notion of waiver as a device to produce finality in litigation.
Waiver of this sort is different than waiver as an expression of considered choice. Waiver as a finality-
producing device speaks to the requirement that litigants follow the rules of procedure, the orderly
processes of litigation. It also has the other function of allowing courts to avoid review of legal claims,
and it is a malleable enough device that it gives courts the ability to decide when to decide an issue. No
one suggests, so far as I can tell, that waiver in this context has much to do with autonomy.
67. For example, consent as a mental state, an attitudinal proposition, helps to demarcate sexual
assaults from other acceptable sexual activity, and in that regard functions as a tool for discerning
social harm. Consent as a form of expression may help to demarcate criminal sexual aggression from
acceptable sexual force (that is, the dividing line between force that is criminal and force that is
inherent in acceptable sexual activity), and in that regard functions as a tool for evaluating the
accused's culpability where there is evidence of subjective nonconsent on the part of the complaining
witness.
68. Subjective considerations are beyond our present concern inasmuch as those considerations
bear on a defendant's competency to consent and his sincerity in doing so. Those considerations
presuppose that mitigation waivers ought to be permitted, the very thing we are now investigating.
69. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 124-25 (1996). See generally
DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRTQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 215-33 (1989). Though I use Professor
Hurd's evocative phrasing, "moral magic," I understand that her conceptualization of consent differs
markedly from that offered here. She understands consent to attain its "magical" powers from the
subjective mental state of the person proffering the consent. See Hurd, supra, at 137 ("The magic that
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is deemed "consent" under the law, we must understand the law to be
saying that that act-a "speech act" 7°-has changed the relationship
between persons, and that the change in relationship is backed up by the
power of the state (i.e., the change is judicially enforceable).
Consent, then, grants permission, enforceable by the state, that
something may be done to the person consenting that otherwise may not
be done. When a capital defendant waives mitigation, he is consenting
(read: granting permission) to undergo a penalty-phase process where
the jury will not receive evidence that most knowledgeable observers and
all capital defense lawyers regard as vital in death-penalty
decisionmaking. The capital defendant's request to waive mitigation,
therefore, is more than just an expression of desire, more than a
reflection of a psychological state. It is a request, if accepted, that
establishes a particular legal state of affairs, one where the penalty-phase
process will proceed in a way that it otherwise could not.7'
To get at the unique character of the Eighth Amendment-and thus,
to see why mitigation waiver conflicts with the Eighth Amendment's
irrevocable injunction against cruel and unusual punishments-we must
briefly investigate how the above account of expressive consent operates
with the criminal procedure rights found in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. We start, of course, with the proposition that waiving
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments constitutes an
expression of consent that a particular legal state of affairs comes into
existence. We shall see that a person's "choice" to waive any of these
constitutional rights has a very important function: the consenting act
transmutes what would otherwise be an unconstitutional governmental
action into a constitutional one.72
At work beneath the surface when it comes to consenting to a state
of affairs that transmutes an unconstitutional action into a constitutional
one are two notions of autonomy, one strong and the other weak. The
strong notion rests on the idea that individuals are in the best position to
transforms the morality of another's conduct.., is done entirely by a person's mental state and not by
her observable behavior."). I do not disagree as a philosophical matter; but in terms of legal analysis,
that conceptualization is too confining, as the discussion in this Article shows. I understand the
"magic" of consent, for my present purposes, to reside in the enforceability of that consent.
70. See J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 98-IO9 (J. 0. Urmson & M. SbisA eds., 2d
ed. 1962); John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 58 TENN. L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1991). I use the
notion of speech act merely to refer to the idea that enforceable consent performs the function of
bringing about a particular state of affairs. See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING:
STUDIES IN THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS 1-20 (1979).
71. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (978) (plurality) (state may not preclude jury from
considering mitigation).
72. My concern here is not the varying prerequisites to finding a valid waiver of a constitutional
right, but in the empowerment of the suspect or criminal defendant to insist upon a waiver. There is no
doubt that "[w]hat suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue." New York v. Hill,
528 U.S. IiO, 114 (2000).
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determine their own interests. On this understanding, people consent
(read: choose to waive rights) because they rationally calculate the costs
and benefits of doing so, or at least are presumed to be in the superior
position to make that calculation.73 Consider as a simple illustration the
consent to open your luggage for a quick search. That decision
presumably rests on the calculation that the intrusion is less onerous than
objecting to the search and consequently delaying or even losing the
benefits of travel.74 Most of us consent often in this fashion, deeming it in
our best interest.
But this best-interest model can hardly withstand the rough-and-
tumble world of real-life law enforcement. The forces brought to bear on
individuals to "consent," to forego constitutional rights, are often
overwhelming. Detectives everywhere struggle daily to extract consent
from'suspects, consent to question without a lawyer present, consent to
search, consent to appear at the local precinct to stand in a lineup,
consent to have a statement recorded on audio or videotape. Prosecutors
negotiate hard with defense lawyers -sometimes using outright
coercion-to extract consent to adjudicate guilt without the efforts and
expense of convening a jury and bringing in witnesses and doing all the
other gladiatorial things that go with the courtroom warfare we call a
trial. Threats of granting and withholding consent are everywhere in this
world. And the coercion tends to be most intense when the granting of
consent is manifestly not in the best interest of the person giving it.
When allowing pressure to induce consent (encouraging it even), the
criminal justice system opts for a weak vision of autonomy, where only
first-order preferences are what matters. Inducing waivers means a
weakened understanding of autonomy because law enforcement officers
induce waivers not by increasing a suspect's ability to choose wisely, but
by doing exactly the opposite. Effective law enforcement pressure, often
using sophisticated psychologically coercive methods, is calculated to
sever first-order preferences from second-order preferences, which by
any account of autonomy is a diminution of it. To the extent we endorse
that sort of law enforcement technique -and we do, maybe rightly so -
constitutional waiver law necessarily endorses this diminution of
autonomy. So, the enemy of autonomy- applications of pressure to
induce consent-is the prevailing practice in bringing about
constitutional waivers, and yet, all the while we honor waivers as
exemplifying autonomy's expression.
73. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) ("'Voluntary confessions' in criminal
law are the product of calculations ... [based on] a belief that further denial is useless and perhaps
prejudicial.").
74. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (973) (stating that "a search pursuant to
consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search").
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How extensive the "waiver" doctrine is vis-A-vis a particular
constitutional right tells us nothing about our notions of autonomy, but it
speaks directly to how favorably we regard the right at issue. There is no
need to apprise a Greyhound Bus passenger of his right to refuse consent
to a search,75 but law enforcement must tell that same passenger, once in
custody and before securing his consent to be questioned, that he has the
right to remain silent and to summon the aid of a lawyer. We can take
from that disparity in the rules of waiver a constitutional declaration
about the relative value we place on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment's
protections. Detectives may resort to trickery, deception, and other
pressure to induce a suspect to talk,76 which is to say, extract his consent,
but the criminal justice system can do nothing to persuade a defendant to
forego representation by counsel-to wit, consenting to an adjudicatory
process without representation." We can take from that disparity in the
waiver rules that police interrogation involves constitutional rights less
precious than the rights associated with the need for counsel during a
trial proceeding. In short, the rules governing when a "waiver" is valid
vary considerably, and that variation is rooted in a judgment about how
we regard the right that is at issue. Which means: waiver is not a window
to understanding our vision of autonomy; it is a flexible device to
regulate the scope of constitutional rights.!8
The concept of waiver regulates the scope of constitutional rights by
injecting a balancing of interests into the constitutional mix. Look again
at the notion of waiver when applied, say, to the Fourth Amendment
context. A motorist is pulled over ostensibly for a broken taillight. The
officer approaches and suspects, though he cannot articulate exactly why,
that there is contraband in the car-drugs or guns. The officer asks for
license and registration. He then asks if he can search the car while his
partner stands a short distance away, gun at the ready. The motorist,
anxious to continue on his journey but otherwise uncoerced, consents to
the search. We structured this scenario above as one involving a waiver:
the officer's search of the car would have been an illegal invasion of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment if not for the motorist's waiver of
his rights thereunder. That waiver converted an illegal search into a legal
75. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
76. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 763 (1989).
See generally Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext,
and Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (I997); Welsh S. White, Police
Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979); Daniel W. Sasaki, Note, Guarding the
Guardians: Police Trickery and Confessions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (1988).
77. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (trial judge has "serious and weighty
responsibility" to protect against improvident waiver of counsel).
78. See generally George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REv. 193 (1977).
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one. But packaging this scenario in terms of waiver is an analytical
choice, not a mandated methodology. If a judge wants to extend the
notion of waiver into a context far different than this situation, it would
serve her purposes to analyze the Fourth Amendment issue here as
involving waiver. But a different analytical choice could be made. The
motorist's consent could be understood not as a waiver of a
constitutional right, but as a voluntary act that must be thrown into the
analytical mix to determine whether the Fourth Amendment has been
violated at all. Consent here need not be understood as a waiver; it may
be one thing we consider in judging the scope of the Fourth Amendment
protection. By sanctioning the search on the strength of the consent, a
court could be understood as holding that the consent helped render the
search not unreasonable. And since only unreasonable searches are
prohibited, the consent rendered what otherwise would have been an
illegitimate search into a legitimate one.79
Either analytical model gets the same result, though there are
implications for other constitutional matters that arise from car stops.
For example, the latter model avoids the thorny question that arises
when the waiver model is used: shouldn't the motorist be informed of her
rights before she is forced to choose between allowing or disallowing the
search? If a valid waiver means being informed of one's options, then the
answer would seem to be, yes, the motorist should be so informed. But
the law holds otherwise, and perhaps for good reason.80 Under a scope-
of-rights model, the analysis bypasses the waiver question. The inquiry
becomes not whether the consent amounts to a valid waiver, but rather,
whether consent was adequate to make the search not unreasonable. To
say there has been a "waiver" of constitutional rights, though true, is to
say nothing substantive; it only expresses a conclusion, an
epiphenomenal fact arising from the legal effect of the expression of
consent.
We can explore this idea with another core criminal procedure
right-the right to remain silent in the face of governmental
interrogation. The conventional locution is to say that a confession
amounts to a waiver of the right to remain silent. But it need not be
packaged as a waiver at all. A right to silence is, more precisely, a right
not to be forced to speak. It is a right against governmental power and
authority, just as a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment is a
right against governmental power and authority to force a person to
involuntarily subject herself to an invasive search. Consent here operates
in exactly the same way as in the Fourth Amendment context. Consent
79. This analytical shift is exactly how the Supreme Court has handled third-party consent issues.
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182-89 (199o).
8o. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
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to speak means speaking without unreasonable coercion. It thus means,
for analytical purposes, that there has been no constitutional violation,
since the violation hinges on the impermissible compulsion to speak.
Consent is the key event for determining the scope of the right, which
means consent need not be understood as a species of waiver, but as an
aspect of the substantive right itself.
To sum up the point: We happen to have a law-enforcement system
where the right to remain silent requires a suspect be told of that
prerogative, whereas a motorist is not entitled to information about the
right to withhold consent. We have a system where trial rights are more
difficult to waive inasmuch as there are more procedural hoops to jump
through before a waiver will be accepted. These procedural differences
reflect not some variable notion of autonomy or a shifting stance on
waiver, but a difference in our understanding of the rights involved-the
relative value and strength of those rights.8'
To see these situations as waiver is to invite the notion that a
person's consent amounts to permission to have one's rights violated,
that a person is consenting not to have the government protect his rights
against the sorts of breaches of his autonomy and dignity that the
Constitution guaranties. To see these situations as waivers in that sense is
to imply that a person may consent to actions that are unconstitutional.
The analytical value in the mitigation-waiver context is clear: a capital
defendant's waiver to actions that are unconstitutional is perfectly fine
here, as well. We are just importing a well-recognized, robust vision of
waiver from these other constitutional contexts to another. But to see
these situations as scope-of-rights scenarios, we see that consent works
differently. There is no breach of autonomy and human dignity when
consent authorizes a search, or when consent authorizes detectives to
record a confession, because there has been no consent to have one's
rights violated. The speech act of consent establishes, by "moral magic,"
that there has been no violation in the first place. Can this be true of
consent in the Eighth Amendment realm as well?
C. CONSENT AND THE UNIQUENESS OF THE CRUEL-AND-UNUSUAL-
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE
The discussion in Part 1I.B allows us to reframe the issue in a way
that gets us out of the Autonomy-Reliability cul-de-sac. If consent to
forego a mitigation presentation is something capital defendants have a
right to insist upon, then we can speak of the mitigation waiver as a "veto
power," a grant of power to the capital defendant to bar the jury from
considering that which it would otherwise be required to consider as a
8i. See Dix, supra note 78, at 216-i9.
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constitutional matter.8' The consent is not the defendant saying, you may
proceed to adjudicate my death worthiness without adducing mitigation
evidence and I will not be later heard to complain; rather, the defendant is
saying, you must establish a state of affairs where the jury is barred from
considering mitigation evidence that otherwise must be considered during
this penalty-phase proceeding. A mitigation waiver, in short, is no mere
waiver of a claim; it is the establishment of a particular, legally
enforceable state of affairs.
The issue, then, is whether this latter state of affairs is itself
permissible. Framing the issue in this more precise way pinpoints a key
flaw in the pro-waiver analysis that we identified earlier. That analysis
focuses exclusively on the internal mental state of the defendant and
deems that worthy of respect because otherwise we disrespect his
autonomy. It treats waiver as a form of subjective consent, with the
judiciary concerned only with the freedom and capacity to form that
subjective state of mind.8" It ignores the allocation of power that occurs
when allowing a capital defendant to waive mitigation, the granting of
institutional authority to insist upon a particular legal state of affairs that
otherwise is constitutionally unacceptable. It suppresses the real
doctrinal question: is it legitimate to allocate that institutional authority,
that power, to the capital defendant?
If consent transforms what would otherwise be unconstitutional into
governmental activity that is constitutional, then we might well ask
whether a capital defendant ought to have the power to elevate what
would otherwise be cruel-and-unusual punishment into that which is not
cruel and unusual. To see why that is the real question here, and to
address it, we must delve into some of the conceptual intricacies of the
Eighth Amendment.
i. Eligibility and Worthiness for Death
The Eighth Amendment's cruel-and-unusual-punishments clause
restricts the manner in which, and to what degree, the state may punish.
It is also a procedural provision, akin to the due process clause, a
provision that has spawned a complex labyrinth - a puzzling maze, really,
that rivals the tax code-of procedural safeguards and rights." The most
notable procedural innovation, established to adjudicate who shall live
and who shall die, is the two-phase adjudication system that we have had
for nearly three decades, the separate guilt and penalty phases.
82. See supra note i.
83. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 398,401-02 (1993).
84. See Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. IH43, 1148-55 (i980); Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, io9 HARV.
L. REV. 355,357-59 (i995).
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Constraining discretion is one constitutional imperative to
legitimating executions, 8' but by no means the only one, or even the most
important. One response to this constitutional imperative is to eliminate
discretion altogether and mandate the death penalty for certain specified
crimes. But that solution to the arbitrariness problem contains a crucial
flaw, one that is vital to understand in analyzing the mitigation-waiver
conundrum. In Woodson v. North Carolina86 and Roberts v. Louisiana,'
the Court struck down mandatory-death statutes because they disallowed
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a
sentence of death." 88 Woodson and Roberts gave birth not to the
understanding of individualized consideration before a death sentence
may be imposed, but to the constitutional stature of that understanding.
With a steep fall into the abyss of arbitrariness on the one side, and
the hovering granite of jury discretion on the other, the path for capital-
punishment jurisprudence to traverse has indeed been narrow and
treacherous. But the decision to travel that path speaks to the immense
importance of our commitment that human beings faced with state-
sanctioned killing not be treated as part of an undifferentiated mass, that
instead they be considered as persons with inner lives and with life
stories replete with successes and failures, loves and losses, opportunities
and obstacles. The capital defendant must be seen as a person before the
jury confronts the crucial question whether, given who he is and what he
has done, his eligibility for the death penalty means that he is also worthy
of it.
There are, then, two findings in any death-sentencing verdict. There
is the finding that the defendant has committed a crime that makes him
eligible for the death penalty. That entails some finding that the killing
was "aggravated" in some statutorily defined way."' And then there is the
finding that the defendant is worthy of the death penalty.' ° Woodson and
Roberts spotlight Gregg's meaning: the death penalty is a cruel and
unusual form of punishment, unless and until certain procedural
safeguards are in place and enforced that compel a jury to determine not
just death eligibility, but death worthiness as well.
For our purposes the death eligibility and death worthiness
85. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. I53, 188-95 (976).
86. 428 U.S. 280(I976).
87. 428 U.S. 325 (976).
88. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
89. See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971-72 (994).
9o. See id. at 972 (worthiness consideration is "where the sentencer determines whether a
defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence"); Buchanan v. Angelone,
522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998) (noting sharp demarcation between eligibility and worthiness for death in
context of evaluating jury charge).
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distinction is the most significant Eighth Amendment development. It
carries with it two ideas that we will focus upon in our inquiry about
autonomy and the notion of waiver in the capital-sentencing phase.
There is the sense of worthiness translated as individual responsibility, so
crucial to the retributive underpinnings of capital punishment9": the killer
is personally responsible as an autonomous being for his crime and thus
deserves death. This is worthiness for death as an expression of
individual guilt, and talk of individual guilt is within the discursive
comfort zone of standard theorizing in criminal-law jurisprudence. But
there is another sense of worthiness that I discuss in Part III, infra, one
that is more subtle, tacit, subversive. Worthiness for death also implies
entitlement of the community to judge, to announce that we, the jury, the
conscience of the community, can pronounce you, the other, no longer
worthy of life. This entitlement derives, in part, from the fact that the
court has given the jury "guidance regarding the factors about the crime
and the defendant that the state, representing organized society, deems
particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.' 92 The underside of this
purported entitlement is the destabilizing proposition that mitigation
evidence may be compelling enough that jurors will feel unentitled to
pass judgment on the defendant; that his particular life story, one of
privations and abuse so appalling that in some fundamental and morally
compelling way, the community-we might well say, society and the
world at large-has failed this individual, and that failure has stripped the
community of the entitlement to punish with death.93 This is death
worthiness that contains within it the destabilizing notion of collective
responsibility and guilt. This is death worthiness that does not merely call
into question the notion of autonomy as a coherent justificatory idea. Far
from it: it takes the notion of autonomy seriously, perhaps more seriously
91. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly constitutionalized retribution under the
Eighth Amendment, I believe it is the paramount theory undergirding the constitutional legitimation
of capital punishment, insofar as retribution as a punishment theory is rooted in Kantian notions of
respect for persons. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (the
Eighth Amendment's central concern is "fundamental human dignity"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 461-62 (1984) (retribution key justification for capital punishment). Personal culpability, not
deterrence, repeatedly surfaces as the most important consideration in capital decisionmaking. See
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-8oi (1982).
92. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
93. I emphasize the community aspect of the death-sentencing decision because that is how
capital punishment is actually experienced-as a community response to crime, not as a governmental
response. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 98-99
(2003) (capital punishment is now more often viewed "as expressions of the will of the community
rather than the power of a distant and alien government"). In fact, one might understand the
preference for jury decisionmaking in capital cases not because juries can do better than judges, but
because juries are independent of the state, consciences of a community that has been directly affected
by the crime. See also Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355 (2004) (identifying the jury's greater
independence from the state than that of judges as important to Constitution's framers).
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than anywhere else in criminal law -a remarkable fact, given how much
lip-service and homage is paid to it in criminal-law theorizing and
adjudication. We must keep this understanding of death worthiness fixed
in our minds as we now proceed to reframe how the mitigation-waiver
conundrum should be analyzed.
2. Refraining the Analysis
Recall our earlier discussion of Ashworth, the case that implicitly
asks a fundamental question: Why isn't the sovereign's obligation to
ensure reliable capital sentencing vindicated by ensuring a reliable death
eligibility determination and by according the defendant a full and
unimpeded opportunity to present virtually any evidence he wants to
show that death eligibility ought not lead to a conclusion of death
worthiness? Once a defendant has been found death eligible, the
Ashworth reasoning goes, the sovereign's distinct interest in capital
sentencing reliability has been satisfied. The question of death
worthiness is not something that the sovereign has a distinct interest in;
its interest is only in ensuring that the defendant possesses the full
panoply of rights that permit him to litigate that question.
What Ashworth brings to the fore is one of the crucial autonomy
questions we must confront: can the Eighth Amendment's procedural
requirements be waived? That question is easily glossed over because the
Ashworth line of argument exploits what we take for granted-namely,
that procedural rights and safeguards are, by and large, entirely waivable.
But we take waiver for granted in the Eighth Amendment context
because we forget that the cruel-and-unusual-punishments injunction
embraces both death eligibility and death worthiness. We forget that it is
not just routine procedural rights that are being waived here, but
procedural requirements that are integral to elevating the death penalty
out of the realm of being cruel-and- unusual punishment. We forget, in
other words, that the death penalty is cruel and unusual absent these
procedural requirements geared towards reliable death-worthiness
determinations. So, when we ask, can the Eighth Amendment's
procedural requirements be waived?, we are in fact asking whether a
defendant may consent to a cruel-and-unusual punishment.
We can start with an easy proposition, that as a matter of intuition
the state's obligation not to inflict inhumane punishment -notably,
torture-ought to be irrevocable and thus not subject to waiver.9' It was,
after all, the revulsion against torture that animated the early Eighth
94. See, e.g., Steven A. Blum, Public Executions: Understanding the "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments" Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a
Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV.
615, 642-52 (2000).
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Amendment decisions.95 We saw in our earlier discussion that consenting
to governmental action that elevates it out of the realm of the
unconstitutional is encouraged because, at the least, such consent does
not diminish us as a society. But when it comes to inflicting torture or
some other barbaric or unusual punishment, this is not so. When
someone is tortured, we are diminished as a people precisely because our
self-identity is bound up with how the state punishes.6 A person's
consent does not erase our diminishment.'
At the very least, it would seem, society itself has a distinct and
heightened interest in the enforcement of the cruel-and-unusual-
punishments clause, separate and apart from a defendant's particular
feelings about it. 8 But does that distinct and heightened interest in
enforcing the injunction against cruel and unusual punishment
necessarily mean that defendants cannot waive procedural rights arising
from that clause? After all, there is nothing remarkable in saying that
society has an interest in enforcing a constitutional right. Presumably,
society has an interest in enforcing all the rights in the Bill of Rights,
particularly those that seem to us central in maintaining a society of
ordered liberty. And yet, as we have discussed earlier, waivers of
procedural constitutional rights have flourished, and they continue to
flourish. How, then, can we say that a capital defendant may not waive
procedural rights arising from the cruel and unusual punishments clause?
3. Why are the Procedural Rights of the Eighth Amendment
Different, for Waiver Purposes, Than Other Procedural Rights?
"Waiver" in the Eighth Amendment context, we now see, differs
from "waiver" in other contexts because the enforcement interest in the
Eighth Amendment context depends not at all on the individual's choice
95. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (189o); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
96. In Trop v. Dulles, a case striking down denationalization as cruel and unusual punishment for
a conviction of desertion during war, the Court said: "The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." 356 U.S. 86, IOO (1958). While citizens delegate
to the sovereign the monopoly power to punish, the dignity of each citizen as a human being limits that
delegation of power: "While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Id. And civilized standards are
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at iol.
97. Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 399 (1985) (regarding
consent to degrading treatment, "it is immoral to participate in such consensual transactions and
immoral for the community to tolerate them"); see also DAN-COHEN, supra note 52, at t61-63.
98. See Trop, 356 U.S. at ioi ("evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society" -a test that expressly calls upon society to address its own moral commitments and
trajectory); Blum, supra note 94, at 449 ("Eighth Amendment decisions revolve not around the
punished but around the punisher."); see also Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
("Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in
the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what
shall be done.").
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to trigger enforcement of the right; society has the primary interest in
enforcing the Eighth Amendment's injunction against illegitimate forms
of punishment. The notion that constitutional rights exist to protect the
innocent and that the guilty invoke them as proxies for the law abiding
simply has no place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.' Enforcement
of the Eighth Amendment is not about protecting the innocent or the
guilty; if anything, enforcement in this context, as opposed to the
availability of enforcement of a constitutional guarantee upon the
triggering of the right, is itself the mandate. The obligatory act of
universal, irrevocable enforcement of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause derives from our irrevocable commitment to protect the essential
moral integrity of society at large. In a nutshell, the moral integrity of
society depends on the actual enforcement of the Eighth Amendment; by
contrast, that integrity is vindicated in other constitutional contexts by
the mere willingness to enforce a constitutional right.'" Understood that
way, we see that the Eighth Amendment is not an individual entitlement
provision, but society's own self-observed and self-enforcing limitation
on governmental action that is independent of the defendant's interest in
enjoying whatever entitlement the provision grants him. Entitlement
suggests a private benefit, and its worth is one that an individual is
capable of evaluating. But the protections of the cruel-and-unusual-
punishments clause is not a private benefit and we do not allocate
authority to individuals to evaluate the worth of those protections. I°' And
so it would seem that no individual ought to have the power to elevate an
99. For a discussion of this proxy theory, see Stuntz, supra note 76, AT 769-86; Akhil Reed Amar,
The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1133 (1996) ("The
Constitution seeks to protect the innocent. The guilty, in general, receive procedural protection only
as an incidental and unavoidable byproduct of protecting the innocent .... ).
Ioo. Seeing the Fourth Amendment scenario outside of a waiver context allows us to see why the
nature of the rights protected by the Eighth Amendment is unique. Whereas consent to search
implicates the scope of the right, not a waiver of the right, consent in the Eighth Amendment context
does not expand or constrict the scope of the rights thereunder. Consent to search may make a search
not unreasonable, but consent to torture does not make that punishment not cruel and unusual. We
can put the matter in autonomy/human dignity terms. Consent to search-theoretically speaking, of
course-makes the search not an invasion of the sort that would otherwise be regarded as a breach of
one's autonomy and human dignity. But consent to torture does not make torture not an assault on
autonomy and human dignity. Consent to torture amounts to consent to having one's dignity violated,
which is a genuine waiver of a right. So the scope-of-rights model does not work with the injunction
against torture and other barbaric and unusual forms of punishment.
1i. For an attempt to conceptualize criminal procedure through the lens of a market analysis, see
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289
(1983). In this framework, we might treat mitigation waiver as a form of "market failure," and thus not
worthy of judicial acceptance. On this view, a capital defendant seeking to waive mitigation is a person
who has lost the ability to estimate appropriately the value of his own life. Where the risks of "market
failure" are high, the availability of waiver must tighten. See Stuntz, supra note 76, at 771 n.24; Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (1986) (noting that
legal interference with private preferences sometimes occurs when a situation mimics that of a
"market failure").
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unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional one by the mere
expression of consent, for the range of acceptable punishments is rooted
in a societal benchmark of what we as a people will countenance.
But still the nagging question: what makes the Eighth Amendment's
procedural rights different from other procedural rights? It is one thing
to bar torture even for those who willingly accept it; it is quite another to
say a defendant cannot choose to forego a procedural right that society is
fully prepared to enforce, if triggered by the defendant's invocation of it.
It is the Ashworth question again: Why isn't the sovereign's distinct
obligations to uphold the mandates of the Eighth Amendment satisfied
by a court's open willingness to enforce the procedural rights?
The answer must be that when a capital defendant consents to a
penalty-phase proceeding that effectively strips from the jury the ability
to evaluate death worthiness, and not just death eligibility, that
defendant cannot be understood to be converting what would otherwise
be illegal into something that is now legal. A consenting motorist does
that; a consenting interrogation suspect does that; a capital defendant
does not. Quite the opposite, in fact. It is crucial to have fixed in our
minds that Furman v. Georgia"' is still good law: the death penalty is
cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg did not overrule Furman. The story
of capital punishment from Furman to Gregg and its progeny is not a
story of executions being deemed cruel and unusual in one moment and
then not cruel and unusual a short while later. The story is one of
resurrection: Gregg resurrected capital punishment by constructing the
Eighth Amendment into an elaborate procedural edifice. A form of
punishment, in short, was elevated above the realm of the cruel and
unusual by the procedural requirements attendant to its infliction.
So, we can now frame our issue in this way: the defendant who seeks
to waive mitigation is, in effect, saying that he waives the right to the
protections spawned by Gregg and mandated by Roberts and Woodson.
The defendant's waiver of mitigation is consent to forego the opportunity
to try to convince the jury that he is not death worthy. The waiver is an
expression of consent to getting the death penalty solely upon the jury's
finding that he is death eligible. To say that the state must validate this
consent is to allocate to the mitigation-waiving defendant the power to
insist upon a process that would otherwise violate our commitment to
eschew any punishment that is cruel and unusual. The point is that when
a capital defendant consents to bypassing those procedural rights, he is
not elevating what would otherwise be illegal to being legal; he is
stripping the process of the very processes that exist to render the death
penalty not cruel and unusual.' 3 It would be analogous to a criminal
102. 4o8 U.S. 238 (1972).
103. See Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, I8i (Pa. 1978) ("The waiver rule cannot be
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defendant consenting to have a jury trial consisting of twelve dogs and
cats. That act of consent would not elevate such an absurdity to an
acceptable adjudicatory procedure precisely because a jury of competent
and fair-minded adults is internal to the very idea of a jury trial. Consent
in both instances does not preserve autonomy and dignity; it authorizes
the trampling of it. A mitigation waiver, in sum, is a genuine consent to
unconstitutional treatment, one that we do not see in the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment contexts.
Does what we have discussed so far extend to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, a basic trial right? This is an important consideration,
since here we approach an area that overlaps with the mitigation-waiver
situation. After all, capital defendants could invoke Faretta and represent
themselves, thus accomplishing the mitigation waiver by choosing, in
their capacity as lawyer, not to present any mitigation evidence.' 4 When
a defendant chooses to represent himself, the conventional locution is to
say that he is waiving his right to counsel. But actually the right to
counsel is the constitutional prerogative not to be forced to represent
yourself 5 The right to counsel is thus akin to the Fourth Amendment
right not to be forced to expose one's privacy in the face of governmental
power and authority, and akin to the Fifth Amendment right not to be
forced to speak against oneself. These are all immunity rights vis a vis thegovernment. "0
Properly framed, under Faretta a defendant's right to counsel has not
been violated because he has not been forced to represent himself. So
consenting to represent oneself need not be understood strictly as a
waiver of counsel. The consent means there has been no violation of the
right to counsel, no forcing of self-representation as there was in Gideon.
Whereas consent to self-representation speaks directly to the parameters
exalted to a position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue -the propriety of
allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a citizen.").
IO4. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 398, 399-400 (1993); United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378,385
(5th Cir. 2002).
1o5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
lo6. There is, of course, the distinction between "trial rights" -those rights that enhance the truth-
finding process (they include the right to counsel)-and rights associated with field-encounters with
law enforcement (notably, our Fourth Amendment rights). That distinction, in the end, speaks to the
level of awareness we demand of waiving parties before we permit them to forego those rights. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (973). "Trial rights" impose upon the state the
obligation to ensure an adequate level of awareness (see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-
44 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (938)), an obligation that the Bustamonte Court held did
not exist with respect to waivers of the Fourth Amendment. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 237. As noted in
the text, Miranda v. Arizona is not an adequate-awareness case, but a coercive-influence case. 384 U.S.
436, 445-48 (1966). The adequate-awareness obligation associated with trial rights reflects not so much
a solicitude for autonomy, but an obligation to ensure a fair trial. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 242.
Solicitude for autonomy is epiphenomenal to the primary goal of preserving the integrity of the trial
process. Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36-38 (1965) (stating that the defendant has no right
to insist upon a non-jury trial).
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of the right to counsel-namely, that one cannot be forced to have
counsel-consent to bypass the procedural requirements of the Eighth
Amendment speaks only to the defendant's purported right to have the
jury sentence him to death in a way that is cruel and unusual under
bedrock constitutional principles.
We can now globalize the distinction. The underlying procedural
rights of the Eighth Amendment enforce the requirement that the jury
decide the sentence after receiving and considering the necessary
information to arrive at a morally reasoned judgment. They are not
rights that incorporate consent to determine the scope of the rights. By
contrast, the scope of the rights arising from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments incorporates consent: consent to search means no
unreasonable search; consent to speak means no involuntary self-
incrimination; consent to representation by counsel means no forced self-
representation. Because consent to bypass a mitigation presentation does
not vindicate the right to legitimate capital sentencing, because it
dramatically sabotages it, consent does not function in the Eighth
Amendment context the way it does in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment contexts. The scope of the rights protected by the Eighth
Amendment cannot be defined or shaped by consent; the scope of those
rights is defined by societal standards alone, and those rights must
therefore be enforced independent of any act by an individual to have
the enforcement triggered.
4. The Power to Consent as an Allocation of Power
One virtue of shifting our locution from waiver to consent is that it
reorients our conceptualization of what we consider to be waiver
situations as instances where legal relationships are transformed. We
shift from seeing the individual relinquishing rights-a conceptualization
that encourages intellectual forays into subjective consent and the need
to be informed of options-to seeing the individual expressing consent, a
form of speech act that grants permission to the state actor to do that
which otherwise could not be done to the person consenting. That, in
turn, invites us to examine the power to consent as an instance of the
state allocating power to the individual citizen. We are, then, dealing
with a troubling ought question: ought we give to the capital defendant
the power to consent to a state of affairs that would render the death
penalty cruel and unusual absent that consent?
Those who approach this ought question from the Autonomy-Ideal
platform-that is, those who insist that respect for individual autonomy
requires we not bar competent demands for mitigation waiver-advocate
protecting the individual's personal interest to pursue his own freely and
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competently chosen ends."'° But this position merges two different types
of interest-one's actual interest and one's antecedent interest. A capital
defendant may well have an actual interest in deciding for himself what
evidence to present on the question of his punishment. An acute interest,
no doubt. We have to admit that there is no a priori reason to discount as
irrational or utterly absurd the notion that a speedy and painless lethal
injection might be preferable to decades existing, if not outright
struggling to survive, in the subhuman conditions of an eight-by-twelve
cell. Nor can we brush aside the high personal costs associated with
fighting for a decade or more as a death-row inmate to have the sentence
overturned. Because we cannot overlook these things, there is some
force to analogizing the capital defendant's actual interest in vetoing a
mitigation presentation to a terminally ill patient's actual interest in
foregoing continued medical intervention.
But while all this speaks to the defendant's actual interest in free
choice, it does not address each person's antecedent interest in preserving
human dignity, an interest that binds all persons as rational agents.' ° In
the capital punishment context, the preservation of human dignity is
expressed in mandating a capital-punishment scheme that maximizes the
reliability of sentencing outcomes through individualized sentencing,
with mitigation evidence presented in an adversarial proceeding."'9 Pro-
waiver proponents do not defend what is implicit in their position-
namely, that the only interest worth considering is the individual's actual
interest and that the Eighth Amendment's protection of the defendant's
antecedent interest in mandating mitigation, which he has by virtue of his
membership in society, is not part of the equation."' What this analytical
lapse reveals is a failure to grapple with the concept of autonomy in favor
of the tendency to invoke it for its rhetorical value.
Note further that the "ought" here is not an imperative directed at
the capital defendant himself, but at the sovereign. The imperative to
107. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1375-76.
1o8. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at 103.
1O9. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 6o2-05 (1978).
iio. This distinction between actual and antecedent interest roughly correlates with Kant's
distinction between contingent imperatives and categorical imperatives. An individual may feel
impelled to pursue a particular end by virtue of her particular contingent situation, but whatever
imperative for action that contingent situation might call for does not make it morally right. Only
categorical imperatives-those oughts that are mandated by non-contingent rationality, oughts that
derive from the injunction to do that which we are willing to universalize as a law of nature that binds
all rational beings-are worthy of being regarded as moral. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at
29-30, 98-Too. A capital defendant's actual interest in waiving mitigation, which pro-waiver
proponents seek to protect in the name of autonomy, is in Kant's formulation a contingent interest
and thus unworthy of categorical protection. But the antecedent interest that we all share in ensuring
the protection of each person's dignity through reliable capital sentencing is more susceptible to
satisfying the sort of categorical imperative that Kant has in mind, and therefore would be an interest
that is more fully attuned to a robust conception of autonomy. Id.
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give the jury available mitigation evidence regardless of the defendant's
subjective desires is not a direct renunciation of those subjective desires.
The ought question here is whether the capital defendant's subjective
desire to veto mitigation ought to be treated as itself an imperative
placed upon the state to forego an essential ingredient to legitimate
capital sentencing. There is, then, a collision not between the Autonomy
Ideal and the Reliability Ideal, but a collision between two competing
imperatives-the imperative deriving from the subjective desires of the
capital defendant versus the imperative derived from the constitutional
commitment to pursue individualized capital sentencing through the use
of mitigation presented in an adversarial sentencing proceeding."' We
have already considered Eighth Amendment-inspired reasons why the
latter imperative trumps the former. Those Eighth Amendment-inspired
reasons, we should now observe, derive from the more general principle
that the power of consent may not be a power to grant authority to
another to do that which the other can never claim a moral right to do.
Torture is one example of this: we have seen as a matter of intuition that
the power of consent does not extend to allowing torture because we
cannot independently claim the moral right to torture. Likewise, a
woman who is told to submit to sexual intercourse or her baby child will
be killed does not consent when she submits, even though she has
exercised a "choice," because her power of consent does not extend to
allowing another to commit that indignity upon her. The capital
defendant who seeks to veto mitigation does not have the power to
consent to a proceeding where the jury must decide between life and
death without information essential to that task because the state can
never claim a moral right to impose a sentence of death in the face of a
jury decision rendered without a presentation of available mitigation.
More practical considerations confirm what we have thus far
explored. Think of what happens in a conventional sentencing situation.
A trial judge, acting as sentencer in a non-capital case, must consider
after a felony conviction where imprisonment is contemplated
information about the offender contained in a presentence investigation
report." ' Waiving a presentence report is not an option: a defendant who
faces incarceration does not have the power to consent to a proceeding
i i i. The Supreme Court's refusal to allocate power to a criminal defendant to insist upon a non-
jury trial loosely accords with the suggestion in the text. The Court essentially reasoned that nothing
comes of the fact that a defendant may not demand that his waiver of a jury be respected, since "the
result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury-the very thing that the
Constitution guarantees him." Singer, 380 U.S. at 36. Disallowing a capital defendant to insist on a
mitigation-free penalty-phase proceeding results in nothing more than a penalty-phase proceeding that
the Eighth Amendment contemplates. To be sure, this reasoning is too glib, as it gives virtual carte
blanche to disregard any attempt at a waiver of a constitutional or other procedural right.
112. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. P.L. § 390.20(4); FLA. R. CRIM. P. § 3 .7 Io; N.J. COURT RULES 3:21-2.
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where the presentence investigation is dispensed with."3 The rationale
for this refusal to allocate to the defendant the power to consent in this
way is, as one court put it, that "a sentencing Judge should base the
sentencing decision on a full understanding of a defendant's past, which
includes a current review of factors such as a defendant's family and
social history and the results of any physical or psychiatric
examinations.""..4 The reason that the federal sentencing guidelines treat
presentence investigations as "essential"" 5 is that a sentencing judge





If the non-capital defendant does not have the power to bar the
presentation of mitigating circumstances in a presentence report-and
thus, bar the sentencing judge from considering mitigating
circumstances-then, at the very least, some compelling reason must be
articulated to justify allocating that veto power to a capital defendant.
The reason cannot be that the capital penalty phase has the trappings of
a trial proceeding, since that attribute of penalty-phase litigation is just
that-a mere attribute. "[D]espite its unique aspects," the Supreme
Court has said, "a capital sentencing proceeding involves the same
fundamental issue involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a
determination of the appropriate punishment to be imposed on an
individual."'"7 Nor can the reason be that a capital defendant has a
greater autonomy interest than a non-capital defendant in controlling his
own fate. Nothing distinguishes the weightiness of the autonomy interest
between capital and non-capital defendants. If anything, the capital
defendant's autonomy interest seems more diminished in the light of the
heightened importance placed on individualized sentencing
determinations in the capital context." 8 In fact, in Gregg itself, the
Supreme Court cited the central role of presentence investigation reports
in non-capital cases to highlight the importance of ensuring that relevant
mitigation is not withheld from the capital sentencer."9
113. See, e.g., People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238 (i974) ("A judge may not ignore those
provisions of law designed to assure that an appropriate sentence is imposed."); Harden v. State, 290
So. 2d 55i, 551 (Fla. 1974); State v. Richardson, 285 A.2d 231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 197).
114- People v. Kuey, 83 N.Y.2d 2 7 8, 282 (1994).
115. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL §6Ai.i cmt. background
(2005). ("A thorough presentence investigation is essential in determining the facts relevant to
sentencing.").
I16. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
117. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,459 (1984).
ii8. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (recognizing a "qualitative difference
between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is
imposed").
II9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976). The Court said:
If an experienced trial judge, who daily faces the difficult task of imposing sentences, has a
vital need for accurate information about a defendant and the crime he committed in order
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Intuition, logic, morality, and even constitutional principle, suggest
that a sentencing jury in a capital case ought not be forced to consider
whether to impose death with less information than what a judge must
consider before sentencing a defendant to a term of years. Yet that is the
inescapable conclusion if a capital defendant is given the sort of veto
power mitigation-waiver proponents advocate.
Inescapable as well is the fact that allocating what we can now say is
an extraordinary power to a capital defendant undercuts the legitimate
functioning of any acceptable capital-sentencing scheme. A mitigation-
waiving defendant is accorded the power to impede a sentencing jury
from carrying out its function, rendering it a "jury" in name only.'20 That
is, the people serving as capital jurors ought not be filtered out of the
analysis. A capital jury is more than just an institutional mechanism to
carry out the capital decisional process; it consists of people who, called
upon by civic obligation to decide between life and death, ought not be
victimized by a capital defendant's veto over the presentation of vital
information they need to do an extraordinary task-one they will forever
live with as an indelible experience. Just as litigants in jury selection may
not deprive jurors of their rights, 2 ' a capital defendant ought not be
given the power to do so by withholding information essential to the job
of sentencing.
The Autonomy Ideal comes off as anemic when we remove it from
abstract considerations of waiver and instead situate the analysis in real-
world terms of power-allocation. Abstract fidelity to the Autonomy Ideal
papers over the perverse irony that those most likely to have powerful
reasons for receiving a non-death sentence are those most at risk of
volunteering for execution. It shoves aside the absurd prospect that of all
the institutional actors in the juridical drama to decide whether the
defendant must die, it is the jury who will remain in the dark about
exactly who this defendant is as a human being. Most importantly, it
obscures the possibility that juries can never have enough information to
decide another's worthiness to live or die. It suggests that society's
concerns extend to process alone, that once the judicial system provides a
"fair" process, nothing else follows because all else is a matter of
to be able to impose a rational sentence in the typical criminal case, then accurate
sentencing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination of
whether a defendant shall live or die by a jury of people who may never before have made a
sentencing decision.
Id.
120. Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 362 (Fla. 2001) ("failure of [the defendant] to present
any evidence in mitigation hinder[s] the jury's ability to fulfill its statutory role in sentencing in any
meaningful way" because the sentencing scheme "contemplates a full adversarial hearing before the
jury with the presentation of evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" (emphasis
added)).
121. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,87 (1986).
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individual sovereignty, not collective obligation. It clouds our vision of
what a penalty-phase proceeding is really about-the mingling of
individual and collective responsibility for crime.'2
III. MITIGATION AND THE MINGLING OF AUTONOMY AND
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
So far we have seen that (i) essential to salvaging the death penalty
from being a cruel and unusual punishment is the consideration of
mitigation evidence, (2) the constitutional guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment differs from other criminal-procedure rights because
its enforcement may not depend on the defendant's decision to trigger it,
and (3) autonomy as a substantive concept (as opposed to rhetorical
slogan) plays little to no role in traditional waiver analysis. These three
doctrinal conclusions support the proposition that no individual
defendant ought to have the power to veto wholesale a mitigation
presentation in a capital penalty-phase proceeding.
But the analysis thus far leaves intact the clash of ideals that
produces the mitigation-waiver conundrum-the clash between the
Autonomy Ideal and the Reliability Ideal. As suggested earlier, we might
transcend that autonomy-reliability dichotomy by disentangling the
capital defendant's actual interest in waiving mitigation from his
antecedent interest in ensuring that each capital defendant's dignity is
protected by insisting that all capital sentencing be reliable. That
antecedent interest, a Kantian analysis suggests, comports with a
philosophically coherent conception of autonomy, whereas the more
contingent actual interest does not.'23 Because the Kantian analysis would
treat the capital defendant's decisionmaking that is rooted in the
antecedent interest in reliable capital sentencing as a better expression of
genuine rational autonomy, the schism between autonomy and reliability
becomes a mirage produced by the misguided valorization of the
defendant's actual interest in waiving mitigation.' 4
The answer to this Kantian analysis, however, reveals what is truly at
122. In a very loose sense, the privacy-basis for allowing mitigation waivers masks what is vital in
the mitigation-waiver debate in a similar way that the privacy-basis for abortion masks what is vital in
understanding gender inequality and violence. Feminist scholars rightly point out that women's sexual
subordination implicates how we regard the fetus. In a world of true gender equality, where
procreation is not tainted by sexual subordination, we would regard the fetus differently-more
hospitable to legal protection-than we now do. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections
on Sex Equality Under Law, soo YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
123. See KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at 103.
124. This transcendence of the autonomy-reliability dichotomy roughly approximates Kant's
transcendence of the subjective-objective dichotomy in moral theorizing. See id. at ioo. Kant's
Categorical Imperative is objective in the sense that it binds all rational agents as such, and it is
subjective in that it arises from the will of the individual governed by pure, non-contingent rationality.
The will is the lawgiver (subjective), and the law that ensues binds all rational beings (objective). Id.
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stake in reconceptualizing the mitigation-waiver conundrum. A capital
defendant's actual interest in waiving mitigation may not conflict with
the antecedent interest in reliable capital sentencing if mitigation belongs
to the defendant. The notion of reliability in capital sentencing, it could
be argued, is predicated on the preservation of a process through which
the capital-sentencing decisionmaking must take place.' 5 That process
may comport with the antecedent interest in reliability, even when the
capital defendant's actual interest in mitigation waiver is honored, so
long as we understand the process to embrace only those things that the
sovereign is obliged to respect. If the actual presentation of mitigation is
an interest that rightfully only belongs to the defendant-as opposed to
the opportunity to present mitigation, which is a sovereign obligation
under the Lockett principle-then the Kantian antecedent-interest
analysis has no traction at all.' '6
So, to transcend the autonomy-reliability distinction, we have
arrived at a fundamental question, one much talked about but
surprisingly unexplored in the capital-punishment literature: what is
mitigation?
A. THE CONVENTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF MITIGATION
What exactly is mitigation?"7 Better yet, what is its function? One
125. With all the talk of "reliability" in death-penalty jurisprudence, it is surprisingly hard to
discern exactly what we mean by it. The essence of the problem is that we cannot evaluate neutrally
whether a particular jury decision to impose death is right or wrong. And so we have judicial
pronouncements about the heightened importance of "reliability" but no definitive statement of how
to evaluate any particular outcome as "reliable," other than through an evaluation of the adjudicatory
process itself. See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury,
2 OHIO J. CIuM. L. 117, 140 n. 130 (2004); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983). But understanding reliability as a
function of process does not really get us anywhere. We are still left with the question, what sort of
process does reliability demand? Certainly, Eighth Amendment reliability "has something to do with
respecting and confronting the humanity of the individual defendant" (Steiker & Steiker, supra note
84, at 371), but it may well be that this "something" is merely the granting of the capital defendant the
unimpeded opportunity to mount a mitigation case in the penalty phase.
126. In fact, on this view, a Kantian analysis would seemingly demand respect for the capital
defendant's expression of his actual interest to waive mitigation as a matter of respecting formal
dignity. For the justification of taking from the capital defendant that which belongs to him-this thing
we call "mitigation" -would then be based on a judgment that the price is too high to let the capital
defendant keep what belongs to him. Kant expressly distinguishes those things which have a "price"
and those things that do not. The latter, he argues, are things with "dignity." KArr, GROUNDWORK,
supra note 54, at 102. Accordingly, disallowing a capital defendant the prerogative to withhold what is
his because of the price to be paid in diminished sentencing reliability violates his dignity.
127. The Supreme Court, it is fair to say, has obsessed over the concept of mitigation in capital
jurisprudence, but has never defined it. A state may not preclude the jury from considering "any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense" that might call
for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis added). It is
therefore unclear how refined a state may define "mitigation," because the act of defining suggests
greater judicial leeway in restricting the admission of evidence proffered by the defense in the penalty
phase than the Eighth Amendment may allow. Compare Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)
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commentator says it is evidence that "situate[s, individual experiences of
violence in their broader social context."'" True enough: a good
mitigation presentation does function to put a broader frame around the
violent episode that necessitates the penalty-phase proceeding. By
recasting the view of the aggravated nature of the crime, mitigation
supposedly diminishes (mitigates) the indignation aroused by the horror
of what the defendant has done. Look at the standard jury instruction in
a capital case and you will see that mitigation is defined in just those
functional terms, as any item of evidence that might weigh in favor of a
life verdict. Mitigation, it is often mistakenly thought (with deadly
consequences), is a counterweight to the horrors of the crime for which
the defendant stands convicted.'29 Recall that the aggravating factors
associated with the crime render the defendant death eligible, which
means he is qualified as a matter of justice-understood retributively as
just deserts"-for execution. Mitigation, the conventional view holds,
softens the iron fist of justice by tempering the application of retributive
impulses.
i. Mitigation and Mercy
Few death-penalty observers and practitioners question the
conventional view of mitigation's function, that at its core mitigation
injects considerations of mercy into the death-sentencing calculus.'3 '
Because mitigation is conventionally understood as a mercy-inducing
device, and because death worthiness is the doctrinal underpinning of
mitigation in capital jurisprudence, death worthiness under the
with Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). Apparently the general rule of evidentiary relevance still
operates as an admissibility screen, but what relevance means in this context is unclear. See Franklin v.
Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988) (suggesting capital defendant may not have constitutional right
to a lingering-doubt jury instruction). Indeed, relevance in the mitigation context suffers from circular
reasoning: "'Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some
fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value."' McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (199O) (quoting State v. McKoy, 372 S.E.2d 12, 45 (N.C. 1988)
(Exum, C.J., dissenting)). Relevant mitigation, in other words, is what a jury might deem relevant in
deciding between life imprisonment or death.
128. Phyllis L. Crocker, Feminism and Defending Men on Death Row, 29 ST. MARY's L.J. 981, 989
(1998)-
129. How explicitly a jury instruction pits mitigation against aggravation depends in part on
whether the capital statute calls for a weighing of mitigation and aggravation-so-called "weighing"
statutes. See generally Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147 (i991); Srikanth Srinivasan, Note,
Capital Sentencing Doctrine and the Weighing-Nonweighing Distinction, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1347 (1995)-
530. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54.
131. See Abramson, supra note 125, at 121 ("At the heart of the Court's early death-is-different
jurisprudence was a struggle to define an ideal of moral consistency that nonetheless left room for the
exercise of moral mercy."); Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of
Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 327-31 (1996). See generally Theodore
Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 165, 175-76 (2004);
Goodpaster, supra note 525, at 302,318.
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conventional view must be a doctrine about mercy.'32 The conventional
understanding of mitigation as a mercy-inducing device explains why it is
so often linked to "[v]ictimization theory," the idea being that the capital
defendant's own past victimization, stretching back to childhood, ought
to provoke mercy.'33
Unless we question the presupposition of mitigation as a mercy-
inducing device, any argument against allowing capital defendants to
waive mitigation must defend the claim that considerations of mercy are
essential to reliable capital sentencing. Those who elevate the autonomy
interests of capital defendants over the jury's need to witness and then
consider a mitigation presentation understand well how difficult it is to
defend the claim that mercy considerations are essential to the legitimacy
of death-penalty decisionmaking. Though mercy may be legitimately
considered, they would argue, it is personal to the convicted defendant,
and thus requiring that the jury consider it over a recalcitrant defendant's
objection hardly strikes at the legitimacy of capital punishment.'34
Pro-waiver advocates, then, seize on the idea of mitigation-as-mercy
because understanding mitigation in that way is more hospitable to their
"autonomy" premise. It is more hospitable not only because it is
questionable to claim that a jury must in every capital case consider
granting mercy or leniency, a claim that anti-waiver advocates seemingly
insist upon; it is more hospitable not simply because the victimization
theory that the mitigation-as-mercy notion embraces is unattractive
sentimentalism masquerading as moral uprightness, a form of moral
kitsch; and it is not more hospitable simply because overriding a
defendant's wish not to seek mercy seems a rank form of paternalism.'35
I32. See Abramson, supra note 125, at 121 n.17 (2004) (death-worthiness judgment understood as
the jury's discretionary act to withhold imposing a death sentence as "a pure act of moral mercy or
leniency"); see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-31 (1985) (finding prosecutor's
summation that jury's sentencing decision would receive appellate review violated Eighth Amendment
because appellate review does not permit considerations of mercy); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
199 (1976) (noting that Furman's demand for non-arbitrariness did not foreclose the exercise of mercy
in deciding against imposing death).
133. Alfieri, supra note 131, at 333.
134. See Bonnie, supra note 4, at 1383-84. This point is reinforced by the fact that "mercy conflicts
with justice." Eisenberg & Garvey, supra note 131, at 167. That is why mercy is a problematic virtue, if
it is a virtue at all. See id. at 167, n. 3 (citing extensive philosophical literature on mercy and its
problematic relationship to justice); Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of
Criminal Punishment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 655, 672 (1989) ("To sympathize smacks of weak and amoral
emotionalism at sentencing; its influence remains suspect.").
135. See generally Sunstein, supra note ioi, at 1171 (stating "the troublesome nature of
[paternalism] ... stems from the fact that the government is claiming to know better than the
individual whether a particular course of action will serve that individual's interests"); David L.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 U. VA. L. REV. 519, 519 (1988) (discussing our
culture's distrust of paternalism). The most notable stance against paternalism was, of course, taken by
John Stuart Mill, who said that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
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Rather, it is more hospitable primarily because asking for mercy
intuitively seems better understood as an individual's prerogative rather
than as an evidentiary mandate. Mercy can never be demanded; nor can
one feel entitled to it. It is "a gift, an act of grace, which the mercy-giver
is free to extend or withhold as he or she sees fit."'136 And on top of that,
since mercy conflicts with justice, it is questionable as a virtue. It is thus
difficult to understand why a capital defendant must abide a mercy
presentation that positively defies his wishes that the jury not consider
reasons for exercising mercy.
While seeking mercy seems to be a personal prerogative, and thus
waivable, the pursuit of dispassionate justice, a retributive justice that is
at the heart of capital punishment, is unquestionably the sovereign's
obligation, a systemic mandate. Furthermore, the criminal law rightly
demurs when it comes to a wide-ranging inquiry into the character of the
defendant. The criminal law focuses on the deed, and from the deed
adjudicates culpability, and from culpability draws some conclusions
about character. What the criminal law does not do is demand that the
conclusions about character be drawn from all possible sources; for if it
did, there would be legitimate howls of protest against the overreaching
of government. And because the criminal law confines the inquiry to the
criminal deed, it is reasonable to argue that considerations beyond the
criminal deed from which conclusions about character might be drawn
are matters that individual defendants themselves must introduce.'37 And
if that is so, then it is reasonable to insist that the state may not compel
such considerations over an individual defendant's wishes.
2. Demonic Agency and the Task of Humanizing the Defendant
This division of duties-the state focuses on the criminal deed, the
capital defendant on reasons for extending mercy or leniency-
encapsulates the conventional view of how capital cases ought to be
tried. Prosecutors urge juries to assess a capital defendant's worthiness to
receive the death penalty by exploiting what one commentator calls "the
myth of demonic agency."'' 8 Demonic agency is the key rhetorical
imagery in the prosecutor's arsenal because it captures the interlocking
nature of autonomy and punishment. At the conceptual level, the
skeletal line of thought would go like this: autonomy is valued because,
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Hackett 1978) (1859).
136. Eisenberg & Garvey, supra note 131, at 168.
137. The idea of the crime reflecting or bespeaking the perpetrator's character stretches back to
Aristotle's argument that one's character is, in a deep sense, chosen. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN
ETHics, book III, ch. 5.
138. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 547 (995) [hereinafter Haney, Social Context]; see also
Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 692 (using the term, "the mythic role of Monster" to capture the same
idea as the "the myth of demonic agency").
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as Mill would say, choice is valued for its own sake. Choice is an
independent good. And it is an independent good because choice is
integral to personhood. Choice, in turn, when understood as a
manifestation of our free will, is key to our understanding of
responsibility, inasmuch as choice allows for assignations of
responsibility. We need only think of extreme cases of coercion or other
so-called involuntary acts to see the truth in the proposition that the
criminal law assigns criminal responsibility based upon the moral
significance assigned to the act of choosing. "The settled moral
understanding is that what you deserve is a function of what you
choose."139
Fostered by the media and by public discourse generally, exploited
by capital prosecutors in virtually every capital prosecution, and
embedded in the belief in free will and autonomy, the idea of demonic
agency trumpets the capital defendant as an autonomous agent,
disconnected from the collective experience of the community, an
autonomous agent who has chosen to express his evil character through
violence.'4 ° Demonic agency conveys that the perpetrator has no personal
history worthy of taking seriously, no authentic human relationships, no
existence within a social context'4 ' -nothing that gives the demonic agent
a human dimension beyond the media-driven caricature of evildoers; no
human dimension other than as the term itself suggests: an autonomous
"self" that serves as the repository for evil choosing. The notion permits
the sentencer to adopt a stance of indifference towards the actual person
who sits at the defense table. That indifference marks the rupture of
human kinship; and that rupture dissipates questions about the efficacy
and morality of the death penalty.'42
The notion of demonic agency flourishes in capital jurisprudence
even though "[u]nderstanding how free will is possible is perhaps the
most vexing of the traditional problems of philosophy."'43 It flourishes
nonetheless because it is useful to prosecutors and congenial to jury
decisionmaking. It is useful and congenial because it propagates a false
'39. Sanford Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
679, 690 (1994). It is, to me, not at all clear that we arrived at our system of punishment by a
preexisting valuing of the Autonomy Ideal. What remains unclear is whether this is, in fact, a post hoc
rationalization for our penal system. Did we consciously arrive at our system of punishment, including
capital punishment, based on the Autonomy Ideal? Or did we inherit this mode of responding to crime
and then work backwards to construct this intellectual edifice, and in so doing realize that we need to
adhere to the Autonomy Ideal? Is the Autonomy Ideal, in short, a product of our punishment system
rather than a key ingredient in the creation of it?
140. Haney, supra note 138, at 550.
141. Id.
142. Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 692 n.I17 (noting the importance of indifference over mere
hatred in capital sentencing).
143. Timothy O'Connor, Introduction to AGENTS, CAUSES, AND EvNTS 3 (Timothy O'Connor ed.,
1995).
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clarity about the capital defendant as an embodiment of evil and nothing
more. It usefully blends an internal contradiction: demonic suggests
inhumanity, the existence within the defendant of an evil force, a
profound deviance in behavior that provokes a conflagration of emotion,
with indignation at the core;' agency suggests a core humanity consisting
of the ability to form preferences, to act on them voluntarily, to choose
one path rather than another, and ultimately to author, and thus be
responsible for, one's own life story. Demonic provokes the passion for
harsh punishment; agency gives us intuitive satisfaction, if not actual
intellectual comfort, that we are genuinely doing justice. This
contradiction usefully justifies mitigation waiver: if the defendant's
crimes are expressions of autonomy (agency), then why not permit the
defendant's next expression of autonomy ( mitigation waiver),
particularly since it is so congenial to the community's quest to punish
and eradicate evil (to stamp out the demonic)?
From the defense perspective, mitigation-as-mercy often gets
translated into the command that the capital defense lawyer must
humanize her client.' 45 What that means-humanize? -is not so clear,
even among experienced capital defense lawyers, but the sentiment is
universal. Wake up a capital defense lawyer in the middle of the night
and ask, what is your most important task in the penalty phase?, and the
response will be, humanize my client. Interlocked with this litigation
mandate is the notion that it is harder to kill someone you regard as
human than it is to kill one who has been dehumanized.16 A major
barrier to humanizing the defendant is the reality that the notion of
demonic agency captures a resilient default reaction when we hear of a
horrific crime.
B. THE HIDDEN ELEMENT IN DEATH-WORTHINESS: THE WORTHINESS TO
PUNISH
To see how the notion of demonic agency powerfully influences
capital sentencing in ways that are largely ignored-and thus to deepen
our understanding of mitigation as something beyond just a mercy-
inducing device-we must first step back and briefly consider the
architecture of jury decisionmaking. Decreeing that another must die at
the hands of the law involves not only a judgment about who the
defendant is, his personal worthiness for life or death, but also a
discernment, perhaps only a nagging sentiment, about our worthiness to
impose death. There are, in short, two types of "worthiness" at work
144. For a critical discussion on deviance theory in criminal-law theorizing, see Robert M. Bohm,
Crime, Criminals and Crime Control Policy Myths, in JUSTICE, CRIME AND ETHIcs 327, 331 (Michael
Braswell et al. eds., 1998).
145. See Goodpaster, supra note 125, at 302, 335.
146. Id. at 321 n.io8.
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here: worthiness to be punished and worthiness to punish.
Worthiness to be punished focuses the sentencer's mind on the
defendant's criminal act, in this instance a brutal killing, unjustified and
unexcused under the law, an act so horrific that the indignation aroused
spurs the desire to execute the offender. Sure, we can speak of the
offender's personal characteristics, his life history and circumstances, but
in assessing worthiness to be punished with death they are mere factors
considered alongside -indeed, in competition with-the gravity of the
crime. Mitigation-as-mercy situates the mitigation presentation within
this judgment about the defendant's personal worthiness to be punished.
The thinking about mitigation as a concept usually ends right there.
But when we add in the other worthiness consideration, the
worthiness to punish, we shift the inquiry in an important, destabilizing
way. Worthiness to punish announces that culpability for the criminal act
is not the only ingredient in calibrating punishment; there must be an
entitlement to condemn. It reminds that deciding punishment involves a
mutuality between sentencer and offender, between jury and defendant,
between community and individual. '47 Worthiness to punish-understood
as the community's sense of entitlement to feel the resentment and
indignation that allows for punishment -48 treats the criminal justice
enterprise as a communicative endeavor, one involving a discursive
practice that binds the accused and the jury.'49
147. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 52, at 259 n.23 (arguing that "the vice of indignity" involves "a
relation between those who show and those who are shown indignity").
148. The law concerning admissibility of victim-impact statements illuminates this understanding
of the worthiness to punish. The notion of death worthiness limited to "worthiness to be punished"
drives the Supreme Court's initial pronouncement on that issue: victim impact has nothing to do with
the moral blameworthiness of the defendant because that cluster of considerations has nothing to do
with the defendant's decision to kill and the act of killing. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-06
(1987). But four years later the Court lifted the ban on victim-impact evidence in a penalty-phase
proceeding. The Court essentially disavowed its earlier focus on moral blameworthiness as too narrow.
The magnitude of harm, the breadth and intensity of suffering wrought by the defendant's killing, may
be considered because the harm to and suffering of the victim's loved ones puts "moral force" behind
the state's evidence. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). That "moral force" can only be the
sentiments of indignation and outrage aroused by the crime that impel the desire to punish with
death-that is, the community feeling of moral entitlement to kill. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447, 469 (1984) (jury decisionmaking in capital cases is an opportunity for expressing the
"community's outrage").
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 583, 613-19, also reinforces the
point in the text. Breyer joined in the decision to strike down Arizona's capital statute that put the
death-eligibility decision in the hands of the judge rather than the jury not because judicial factfinding
usurps power from juries in the abstract; but rather, because the jury must have ultimate control over
the particular moral judgment whether to impose death. That judgment must reflect the community's
particular sentiments of indignation and outrage-in my terms, the community's particular feeling of
entitlement to impose death. To Breyer, the issue is not whether juries are better factfinders than
judges. The issue is whether juries are better situated to divine an entitlement to execute an
offender- and they are, according to Breyer, because they represent the collective. Id. at 615.
149. See R. A. Duff, Law, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal Liability, 18
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In this communicative enterprise we cannot do otherwise but use
ourselves as barometers, our values, our expectations, our self-
understanding, our capacity for honest reckoning with our own fears and
failings and vulnerabilities, our empathic capacities-a myriad of things,
much of it unknowable, that concern who we are rather than who the
defendant is-to formulate a settled moral confirmation that we are
entitled to pass judgment.5 ° Although a communitarian sense of
worthiness to pass judgment comes into play most acutely in the capital-
sentencing process, it pervades criminal jurisprudence. But because our
legal discourse is so steeped in autonomy rhetoric, 5' we find ourselves
sheepishly smuggling into the criminal justice process communitarian
considerations of worthiness to punish."' Sheepishly, in part because we
hesitate to accept wholesale any single autonomy-based justification for
punishment. Neither deterrence nor retribution fully satisfy our appetite
for moral justification. Blending them feels dishonest inasmuch as it
smacks of resorting to post hoc rationalizations. Communitarian
considerations of the worthiness to punish satisfy a deeper need, one of
having our criminal laws express communal norms in a more
O.J.L.S 189, r97-2o (1998); cf. Peter Aranella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the
Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 15 1', 1544 passim (1992)
(arguing that excuse defenses that deny the offender's status as a moral agent imply judgments about
the offender's ability to participate in the community's particular practice of moral discourse). Indeed,
it would seem that punishment, by its very nature, is communicative. It makes no sense to construe as
punishment the imposition of some hardship on another without communicating that the hardship is
connected to some attribution of blame. And that means punishment is conceptually linked to a
process of adjudication.
I5o. Cf. Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 673, 696 (arguing that emotions do and ought to play a role in
sentencing). Indeed, "[t]o insist that sentencers have no personal ... feelings about the punishment
issue, would come close to prohibiting the decision itself." Id. at 696.
I5i. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, io5 HARV. L. REv. 959,
988 (1992) ("The law, especially criminal law, professes an individualistic ethic that allegedly precludes
any form of collective responsibility."); George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and
Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, III YALE L.J. 1499, 1503 (2002) ("A single
methodology dominates the legal discourse of our time. Whether the talk is of law and economics, of
constitutional law, of corrective justice, or of human rights, the methodology remains the same. What
counts is individuals, their rights, their preferences, their welfare.").
152. Communitarian considerations of worthiness to punish must be smuggled into the process
rather than openly discussed even though these considerations are deeply rooted in the Western
tradition. The process of blaming expresses the community's indignation and resentment towards the
offender. See R. A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 39-73 (1986). If, as I maintain, indignation and
resentment is only compatible with feelings of entitlement to condemn, then unadorned collective
indignation and resentment cannot coexist with collective guilt or responsibility for the offender's act.
The latter diminishes the former. How much depends on the particular circumstances. This line of
thought calls to mind Plato's arguments for the community's imposition of lesser punishment in cases
where criminal acts fail to bring about the harm that was intended. The community's entitlement to
impose punishment, based on circumstances apart from the defendant's particular blameworthiness,
may diminish the punishment that the wickedness of the offender's act seemingly calls for. See PLATO,
COLLECTED DIALOGUES 305,320-21, 838-39 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., i961).
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sophisticated way than either deterrence or retribution theory can.'
5 3
C. A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF MITIGATION: GUILT, COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY, AND CAPITAL SENTENCING
What I now want to put forth is an idea that the autonomy-versus-
reliability debate suppresses. In the capital context, the moral worthiness
to punish, rather than the defendant's worthiness to be punished for
having committed the crime, implicates repressed notions of collective
responsibility, and in some instances, collective guilt.' 4 To show what I
mean, we need to unpack a bit more the process of capital sentencing.
The conventional theory of mitigation surely has it right that the penalty
phase involves a war between the forces that seek to dehumanize the
defendant (and hence facilitate the entire process devoted to killing him)
and the forces to do the opposite, to endow him with human qualities.'55
Needless to say, the humanizing process is calculated to morally engage
the jury in the reality of what it is being asked to do. The decisional
process is wrapped in the garb of kinship, a feeling of connection with the
defendant-not because he is likable or someone with whom a friendship
could be forged, but a more basic kinship, a recognition that he, too, is a
human being with all the recognizable and relatable weaknesses and
vulnerabilities that attach to being human. The conventional theory of
mitigation understands this insight well, and effective capital-defense
work depends on it.
56
But stripping the defendant of the garb of kinship does something
153. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY
252 (I99O) (discussing the expressive theory of criminal punishment, especially its meaning in terms of
"power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations").
154. I should make clear at the outset that I do not use the notions of "collective responsibility"
and "collective guilt" to denote the attribution of primary responsibility for a crime upon a collective.
For a discussion of "collective responsibility" in this strong sense, see Dan-Cohen, supra note 151, at
985. I have in mind a weaker meaning, one suggestive of a society's or community's breach of its
fiduciary obligations towards a member such that the collective's entitlement to punish is affected.
Although my argument here harmonizes with Dan-Cohen's contention that "one's social identity is a
genuine constituent of the self" (id. at 986), I do not contend that mitigation functions in a way that
Dan-Cohen says other criminal-law defenses function. Dan-Cohen characterizes criminal-law
doctrines of involuntariness, provocation, and duress as "distancing devices," meaning that they serve
to distance the accused from the harm that was caused by virtue of the accused's "refusal[] to identify"
with that harm. Id. at 99o. As the discussion that follows should make clear, mitigation in a capital trial
(other than the mitigator of "residual doubt") ought not be understood as a statement that the
defendant is not the author of the capital crime, and is therefore not responsible for it. Collective
responsibility here is not used to distance the defendant from the crime, but to enhance our
understanding of how the defendant has come to author it.
155. See Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 699 ("Prosecutors seek to dehumanize defendants while
defense attorneys attempt the reverse.").
156. A capital-defense lawyer must lead jurors to "an empathetic understanding of [the
defendant's] social history from a largely subjective perspective." Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice
and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the 'Will of the People,' 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 303, 329
(I997).
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far more powerful than just render the evil perpetrator as the other, a
thing other than us, most emphatically not us. It brings on a sense that
we, the community for which the jury is the proxy, are worthy to pass
judgment, to say of the defendant that his innate capacity for
redemption-a basic Judeo-Christian "truth"-either exists no more, or,
even if it still lingers somewhere deep and inaccessible within the
perpetrator, the nakedly evil act eclipses it.' 7 The defense may have
succeeded in awakening in the jurors the recognition that the defendant
is a flesh-and-blood human being, but that may do nothing to ward off
the jury's sense of moral worthiness to punish, a sentiment often
nourished by the desire to protect the community. That is, the death
verdict may reflect not so much the success of the prosecution to
dehumanize the defendant, but the jurors' sense of entitlement to act in
community self-defense. This is often the most powerful impetus for
sentencing a defendant to death.
So, the prosecution's efforts to dehumanize the defendant works not
so much on the logic of the defendant losing his entitlement to live-the
horrific crime itself tends to accomplish that-but on the psychological
level of creating a feeling of entitlement, a worthiness, to kill him. Put
another way, what makes the prosecution's efforts to dehumanize the
defendant such an effective weapon is that it permits jurors to disclaim
responsibility for what the defendant did. To dehumanize imported
Africans, for example, is to disclaim responsibility for all the evils
wrought by slavery. So, too, with capital defendants. To dehumanize
them is to disclaim any breach of society's fiduciary obligations to its
citizens, to disclaim responsibility for the failings of our educational
system, welfare system, child-protective services system, incarceration
system, etc. To disclaim is to isolate. It is to treat the offender as a single
autonomous being fully capable of exercising free choice, or at least
capable enough to be regarded as the sole author of his violent act. And
as sole author of his violence, the murder is properly seen as an
expression of his being. Classic autonomy-based reasoning.
Paradoxically, the relentless efforts to dehumanize the defendant, to
sever his historical and current ties with the community, feed the notion
that he is an agent, the agent within the notion of demonic agency.
See why prosecutors routinely respond to mitigation evidence with
talk of the defendant's numerous opportunities to conform his behavior
to the law? See why they drive home facts about the offender's many
157. The loss or retention of a redemptive capacity drives much of capital decisionmaking, just as it
does philosophical debates about the moral legitimacy of the death penalty itself. See, e.g., ALBERT
CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 230 (Justin O'Brien
trans., 1974) ("We know enough to say that this or that major criminal deserves hard labor for life. But
we don't know enough to decree that he be shorn of his future-in other words, of the chance we all
have of making amends.").
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rejected avenues for self-improvement, his failure to do what so many
others have done-escape the hardships and oppressions of poverty and
abuse and addiction and all the rest of what characterizes ninety-nine
percent of capital defendants? The defendant, prosecutors like to say,
exercised choice throughout his life, and the death-eligible crime is but
the culminating choice, the choice to do evil. Arguments centering in one
way or another on "choice" tend to be effective because, although jurors
may feel moved by stories of extreme poverty, serious abuse, and other
sorts of privations, they are not mitigating unless they somehow reduce
the defendant's responsibility for what he did.'5 8 What I want to
underscore here, though, is that prosecutorial arguments about "choice"
speak to more than just the defendant's supposed individual failings as
an autonomous being; they speak to the more compelling and deeper
psychological point that society warrants no blame, no responsibility, and
that we are therefore worthy to pass judgment because the proper
allocation of blame is a single pipeline leading directly to the defendant.
Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein speak of something similar,
though in a very different context, when they observe that
"individualized guilt may contribute to a myth of collective innocence.'
5 9
This single pipeline of blame is critical to establishing worthiness to
punish. The blame for the crime is something the defendant must alone
carry. The horrors of the crime, the ensuing anguish and wrenching
sorrow-the defendant as demonic agent alone owns it all, and that often
is enough to bring jurors to the point of voting for death. The whole idea
of worthiness to punish does not even occur to us, so complete is our
embrace of the Autonomy Ideal. "[D]emonizing the perpetrators of
certain kinds of crimes gets the rest of society off the hook for attitudes
and practices that are widespread but which implicitly promote and
condone violence."' ' That is, the power of the notion of demonic agency
is so complete that it suppresses even the thought of collective guilt, or of
distributed guilt, or of collective responsibility; it suppresses our failures
as a collective tied together in a socio-political and cultural network
where in many ways, seen and unseen, we are responsible for the well-
being of our fellow citizens, particularly our children. As one
commentator puts it, "As a society... we persist in attributing free
choice to the actions of those we find most deplorable and
incomprehensible by distancing ourselves from any responsibility we may
158. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1539 (1998). Too often such evidence actually provokes a backlash, a
rebellion by jurors against what they perceive to be "narratives of excuse." Alfieri, supra note 131, at
347.
159. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HuM. RTs. Q. 573, 580 (2002).
16o. Haney, supra note 138, at 557-58.
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
have-not for the actions of the capital defendant-but for fostering an
environment that reared the individual who committed those actions."
'' 6'
The notion of demonic agency, then, severs any link between the
defendant's violent act-most often a spasm, an eruption, of violence,
not a systematic orchestration of violence we see exhibited by organized
crime and governmental actors-and society's breach of its own fiduciary
obligations to the individual. Society's failures lead to violence, broadly
understood, inflicted on helpless children, who then grow up emotionally
and cognitively stunted and thus debilitated in their ability to navigate a
complex world, who then are inflicted later by the self-medicating
violence of drug addiction and the warping effects of sick human
relationships. Severing the link between the defendant's violent act and
society's fiduciary breach is easy because the notion of demonic agency is
easy to accept. Departing from it, undoing its grip, or just merely
questioning it, is extremely difficult, even for those in the criminal justice
business. 162
Resurrecting the humanity in the defendant through an effective
mitigation presentation ineluctably distributes responsibility across a
wider network of social actors. A true focus on the individual defendant
impels an investigation into the interdependence of the individual and
the collective. No surprise, then, that the most effective way to resurrect
the defendant's humanity is to tell the defendant's story of obstacles
beyond personal control and of his adaptations, coping efforts, struggles,
and failures in overcoming those obstacles.'6 3 The most effective
mitigation presentation, the genuine aspiration for a penalty-phase case,
and thus the core meaning of mitigation, must incorporate this story of
adaptation, coping, struggle, and failure.' 64 The crime is no longer just a
161. Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist Narratives to Deconstruct the Myth
of the Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 569, 584 (2oOo-OI). There has been some
empirical work that gives limited insight into how jurors treat notions of collective responsibility when
a mitigation case puts the idea forward. See Garvey, supra note 158, at 1565 (stating "notions of
collective or societal responsibility for shaping the defendant's character played some role in jurors'
capital sentencing decision, especially if it appeared that the defendant tried to get help for his
problems but society somehow failed him").
162. See Haney, Social Context, supra note 138, at 551.
[T]he broad sociological forces that constitute the larger context of the crime, the
background and history of the defendant, and even the deeper psychological issues that
help to account for why a particular crime was committed by a specific defendant, are
complex questions that often elude even those charged with the responsibility of
investigating and prosecuting the crime.
Id.
163. See Alfieri, supra note 131, at 347-48 n.143; Robin West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death:
A Comment on the Death Penalty Cases from the 1989 Term, I MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 167
(I990) (underscoring "the very real need to assign and then acknowledge both individual and societal
responsibility for the consequences of actions").
164. See Craig Haney, Violence and the Capital Jury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the
Impulse to Condemn to Death, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1466 (1997) (The "defendant's final destructive
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crime, but in a penalty-phase narrative a tragic culminating failure in
coping.
This sort of storytelling in capital prosecution-a mitigation
presentation that goes beyond appeals to mercy-is critical because it
refutes the shallow prosecutorial appeals to autonomy with a more
robust one: "Autonomy evaluates the offender's moral struggle-the
extent to which forces beyond the offender's own desires impelled the
choice to offend."' 65
i. Understanding Mitigation Through the Lens of Causation
We can speak of mitigation in causation terms, just as we can speak
of free will and autonomy in causation terms.' 66 Theorists, legal
practitioners and judges sometimes puzzle over when a force that
precedes and is linked to an event is deemed a cause of that event or a
mere circumstance of it. '67 To use a famous example, consider how we
treat the flicking of a lighted cigarette onto dry ground. Intuitively we
treat the smoker flicking the cigarette as the cause of an ensuing fire; the• 168
dryness of the ground we treat as a circumstance. Both are causes in a
materialist sense. There is no a priori justification for excluding as a
cause the circumstance that the ground was dry and thus susceptible to
catching fire. We label the act of flicking the lighted cigarette a cause of
the fire and the dryness of the ground a circumstance of it to reflect our
attribution of responsibility. It reflects a societal judgment. The judgment
of causation in the criminal-law context-and tort law, too-is an
exercise, largely intuitive, in singling out what force (or less often, forces)
to identify as the responsible agent for the occurrence. That entails a
process of exclusion, the removal from our consideration a myriad
collection of forces that always contribute to an occurrence. What gets
excluded as a cause, as a responsible force to an occurrence, is evaluated
outside logic.'
69
So, we might well ask, are poverty, childhood abuse and trauma,
acts may be the culmination of failed struggles against enormous odds or a lifetime of attempts to
overcome extraordinary barriers, disadvantages, and otherwise overwhelming circumstances.").
165. Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 695.
I66. In fact, the concept of free will is best understood in causation terms. A person acts with "free
will" when she acts causally without herself being caused to do so. See IMMANUEL KANT, Passage from
a Metaphysic of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason, in KANT: POLrTCAL WRITINGS 114 (H. S.
Reis et al. eds., 1991).
167. John Stuart Mill said we pragmatically discriminate between "cause" and "mere background
condition" in our everyday speech to attribute responsibility. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC
bk. III, ch. V, § 3 (4th ed. 1856). See generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 0970).
168. For a discussion of hypothetical scenarios such as this, see H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORE,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 68-83 (2d ed. 1985).
169. See MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, supra note 167. The Model Penal Code, for example, suggests
having the factfinder determine what is just when concluding that something is a "cause." See MODEL
PENAL CODE §§ 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (1985).
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drug addiction, and a whole range of other typical mitigation
considerations causal factors to the criminal act or mere circumstances of
it? Put another way, do we include or exclude it from our consideration
of how and why the crime occurred? In treating these considerations as
mere circumstances, too remote to be regarded as causes, we do not
necessarily deny their power to influence behavior. We only mean to
stand by the conclusion that the proper attribution of responsibility is
with the defendant as the isolated autonomous agent.
The politics and moral judgments that flow from this linguistic
categorization are crucial. Circumstances, we have come to think, can be
and often are overcome by force of will. Circumstances are not destiny;
they do not necessarily produce the shattering act of crime. This is the
starting point of any analysis in criminal law, for the entire edifice of
criminal-law doctrine is built upon the assumption that, except in the
rarest of instances, human choices cannot be caused. 70 I do not intend to
critique this stance but only to observe here that attribution of
responsibility depends on it, depends in particular on socio-economic
conditions being seen as mere circumstance, just as childhood trauma,
addiction, low I.Q., poor schooling, and other conventional mitigation
considerations are. These considerations -these circumstances, if you
will-are the backdrop for the presumed operation of free will,
autonomy, and the overall cognitive processes of choosing to do good or
to do evil. And for that reason we are comfortable in saying that poverty,
abuse, and the rest of it are linked to crime, that they create the
conditions for crime, and that therefore- and this comes perilously close
to using the word cause-that crime is a consequence of such
circumstances, because that still permits us to talk of autonomy, of free
will, of the capacity of the individual to choose to capitulate or overcome
those circumstances.
But background conditions, what we might instinctively regard as
mere circumstances to an event, can be linguistically elevated to being a
"cause" based on the persuasiveness of other evidence. For example,
suppose one flicked a cigarette on a ground saturated with flammable
liquid rather than just dry ground. Now the cause-circumstance
categorization shifts. The cigarette now becomes a circumstance and the
saturated ground the true cause. Consider another simple hypothetical.
Defendant and victim are in a scuffle on a cold winter night. The
sidewalk is icy. Victim lands a hard blow. Defendant stumbles backward,
reaches for his gun, slips on the ice and falls on his rump. Fearful because
now in a vulnerable position, defendant fires his gun and kills the victim.
No one would say that the ice patch caused the victim's death, even
170. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 530-37 (1996). See generally
Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. REv. 879 (2000).
[Vol. 57:693
March 2006] THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT WHO WANTS TO DIE 745
though a counterfactual scenario might suggest it was a cause (i.e., if the
ice patch were not there, defendant would not have fallen, and thus
would not have fired the gun). The icy condition of the sidewalk was just
that, a mere circumstance associated with the shooting.
But what if the victim lured the defendant to the icy spot so as to
secure an advantage in the fight, only to have his scheme backfire? What
if the lighted cigarette sparked a fire only because another person fanned
the ignited brush? What if the capital defendant was raised by a
psychopathic parent who abused him relentlessly throughout his
childhood, aware of the risk of producing a replica of himself, another
psychopath? The ice patch, the dried brush, the traumatic childhood-
are these things now only mere circumstances? However one may answer
these questions, the point is simply to expose the scalar quality of the
cause-circumstance distinction. That scalar quality of causation is crucial
to properly understanding mitigation. Whether something is mere
circumstance or cause is itself a process of choice, a classification choice.
Classifying the defendant's horrid life circumstances as mere
circumstance involves distancing ourselves from him, washing our hands
of any responsibility for the defendant's actions.
When mitigation is powerful enough that the jury classifies the life-
history evidence as not circumstance but as causally connected to the
crime, the crime itself recedes into being a circumstance of the
defendant's life, part of a larger truth where social forces, institutional
forces-the collective-become part of the decisional mix.'7 ' It is here
that the mutuality of sentencing, of passing judgment, comes into play as
a psychological force. So the image here is one of shifting focus, of
certain things receding into the background and other things coming into
view.'72
All this is to say that responsibility is not a thing, an essence we can
capture with some conceptual net. When we speak of responsibility,
individual or collective, we speak of meaning being endowed,
significance attributed, to some extent of our choosing, to consider this
or that circumstance as important, as worthy of our attention. And so,
171. The point in the text is akin to one philosopher's observation that "the more thoroughly and
in detail we know the causal factors leading a person to behave as he does, the more we tend to
exempt him from responsibility." John Hospers, Psychoanalysis and Moral Responsibility, in THE
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 452 (William P. Alston & Richard B. Brandt eds., 2d ed. 1978).
172. It is too simplistic to disregard claims of fiduciary breaches by society as old-fashioned
poverty-causes-crime rhetoric. My invocation of the idea of collective responsibility does not equate
the individual's culpability with society's more abstract, more amorphous responsibility to its citizens;
nor does it suggest the latter displaces the former. There are, as Karl Jaspers observes, different layers
of guilt: criminal, moral, and metaphysical. KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 31-32
(E.B. Ashton trans., 1978) (1947). While the individual may indeed be guilty in the "criminal sense,"
that does not resolve the other layers of guilt or responsibility that, I submit, bear on the distinct issue
of entitlement to inflict a certain type of punishment.
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mitigation works by expanding that cone of causation where a collection
of forces becomes relevant, not as mere backdrop to the activities of an
autonomous agent, but as a consideration that amplifies the notion of
autonomy itself. The struggle over whether to treat mitigation evidence
as more than mere circumstance is a struggle to understand the
presentation of mitigation as something beyond a mercy-dispensing
issue. It is to understand the entire project of presenting mitigation as an
attribution issue, as part of the essential Eighth Amendment project of
attributing the just amount of responsibility upon the capital defendant.
While the pursuit of mercy may rightly be a prerogative of the capital
defendant, the attribution task, the proper calibration of individual and
collective responsibility, must be the irrevocable obligation of the
sovereign.
2. Understanding Mitigation Through the Lens of Autonomy
Once we see that mitigation empowers the jury to accomplish this
attribution task, where attribution in this context implicates the profound
question of the collective's entitlement to impose death, then the
Autonomy Ideal seems misplaced. We might overlook that fact-how it
is perverse to use the Autonomy Ideal to dispense with the attribution
question, since the attribution question itself brings to the fore issues
about autonomy and collective responsibility-because we tend to get
seduced into thinking that mitigation must be a counterpoint to the
crime, a contest between aggravating factors and mitigating factors,
justice versus mercy. Treating mitigation in this adversarial way seems
natural because legal discourse resists incorporating, let alone
understanding, notions of empathic knowledge.'73 And yet empathic
knowledge is absolutely vital in capital sentencing because empathic
knowledge infuses true substance into the idea of autonomy. 4
When we strive to understand the forces that stunt the development
of genuine autonomy, we do not slide into deterministic reasoning; nor
do we deny the importance or legitimacy in building and committing
ourselves to a discursive practice that privileges notions of autonomy and
free will. We do not renounce the view that people act for reasons and
173. Cf. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987). See generally
JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 3-15 (1976); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. V (G.M.A.
Grube trans., 1974); JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
174. See Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 695 ("Autonomy relates to the offender's ability to choose
between right and wrong, good and evil. Autonomy evaluates the offender's moral struggle-the
extent to which forces beyond the offender's own desires impelled the choice to offend. Empathy
supplies the motivation to take autonomy limitations seriously."). Pillsbury's project is akin to mine
insofar as he strives to arrive at a way of thinking about retribution without resorting to notions of
mercy, leniency, and forgiveness; instead, he investigates-rightly, in my view-a way of
understanding just deserts that accommodates empathic considerations. See id. at 694 ("Aimed at
moral understanding, empathy does not require or imply forgiveness. It simply strips away nonmoral
reasons for blame.").
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not merely from causes. We instead aspire to understand more deeply
the defendant's actual autonomy-his autonomy in a descriptive, not an
ascriptive sense -and thus more honestly respect his essential dignity as a
human being, which is the anchor to retributive justice. What is thus
significant in the "free-will versus determinism" debate is this, and this
only: the controversy over free will-that is, the challenge to it posed by
ideas of determinism -reflects a heightened consciousness of how
enmeshed the self is in society and how profoundly influenced the self is
by social and institutional forces. A mitigation case, when it is effective,
creates an unsettled outlook towards free will by raising just this sort of
consciousness. Beyond that, the "free-will versus determinism" debate is
probably unresolvable and perhaps even ultimately fruitless.'75
Understanding mitigation, therefore, is understanding what we
earlier saw to be crucial to a full appreciation of "autonomy." Treated as
a meaningful idea, autonomy is not an attribute of birth, as much legal
theory and academic philosophizing would have it, but an acquisition
gained over time, over many years of healthy social development,
healthy development that depends on a healthy collective. Autonomy in
a robust sense treats preference formations as socially constructed,
shaped by institutional forces and impersonal circumstances. Autonomy
presupposes an intact "self," one still connected to the "most basic
aspirations of human beings [which is] the need to be connected to, or in
contact with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of
fundamental value.' ' 6  Mitigation necessarily spotlights this
understanding of the "self," for "this orientation to the good is essential
175. See Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and
Determinism, 8 BUFF. CiuM. L. REV. 599, 6oi (2OO5). See generally Thomas A. Green, Freedom and
Criminal Responsibility in the Age of Pound: An Essay on Criminal Justice, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1915,
1917-19 (1995) (noting that the free-will-versus-determinism debate has been with us for hundreds of
years). More attention has been paid to this debate than any other in philosophy. See Westen, supra at
599. Robert Nozick found the free-will-versus-determinism debate "the most frustrating and
unyielding of problems." ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 293 (I98i). It may well be
that we cannot coherently distinguish between free will and determinism in a way that accords with
any observable reality. See NAGEL, supra note 61, at 112-13; cf. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in FREE
WILL 174, 177 (Gary Watson ed., 1982) (our individual identity and attributes are largely a matter of
"luck," thus problematizing our justification of imposing blame). I am inclined to side with the
philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer: free will and determinism may both be true, but if pressed too
hard, these ideas render themselves incoherent. See ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PRIZE ESSAY ON THE
FREEDOM OF THE WILL 98 (1999) (speech delivered in 1839 where Schopenhauer argues that freedom
of will exists, but the nature of an individual's "willing" derives from a self that is largely determined
by outside forces); Westen, supra at 6ol-O2. For an interesting discussion of determinism and the act
of willing, see Wolf, supra note 62, at 137. For a discussion of determinism generally, see ROBERT
KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 95-96 (1996); Steven Goldberg, Evolutionary Biology Meets
Determinism: Learning from Philosophy, Freud, and Spinoza, 53 FLA. L. REV. 893 (2OO1); Westen,
supra.
176. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 42 (1989).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to being a functional human agent.' 7 Socially constructed preference
formations, an intact "self" meaningfully connected to a pursuit of
something of fundamental value, autonomy understood as implying some
degree of critical self-awareness-these are the conceptual ingredients
that reveal how it is that the collective is mingled with the individual.
These conceptual ingredients are the conceptual foundation for a
mitigation presentation, for "[tihe community is... constitutive of the
individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations which define him are
drawn from the interchange which the community carries on."'' s What a
mitigation presentation therefore shows, when it is most effective, is that
the abusive and traumatic experiences of the child who grew up to
become the capital defendant occurred amidst society's failure to protect
that child. 79 What an effective mitigation presentation does, when it is
most effective, is "suggest a powerful indictment of our legal, social, and
educational systems that failed to recognize [the defendant'si disabilities
at a point in time when it could have made a difference."' Collective
responsibility is internal to the very idea of mitigation.
Mitigation is therefore not a mercy-driven counterpoint to the crime.
Its target is indifference. Outrage will always be there. It is a losing
proposition to present mitigation in the hopes that mercy will soothe the
outrage. Mercy cannot mitigate the crime itself. All that can be done is to
overcome the indifference that that outrage produces -indifference
towards the actual person that sits at the other end of the room, which
means an indifference towards how and where that person fits within the
larger community.8' Targeting indifference has nothing essential to do
with mercy or forgiveness.
Still, although collective responsibility is internal to the very idea of
mitigation, narratives of collective responsibility do not occur naturally in
mitigation presentations, for two reasons. First, we too often fail to
177. Id.; see also CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
213-15 (1985).
178. CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 8 (1985); see
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-82 (1982); cf. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 175, at 501 ("The choices that are viewed as significant and central to a
person's life and self-definition may vary from culture to culture ... .
179. Haney, Social Context, supra note 138, at 575.
[Ilnstitutional failure is another theme that is prominent in the lives of capital defendants-
ranging from the lack of desperately needed intervention to intervention that is ill-
conceived, poorly and inadequately funded and staffed, to intervention that is terribly
destructive of the human spirit .... [Nlowhere is the damage of institutional failure clearer
and more painful to contemplate than in the case of children who are confined by agencies
of social control, only to have that experience worsen, sometimes irreparably, the very
problems their incarceration was designed to remedy.
Id.
18o. Crocker, supra note 128, at 1002.
181. See Pillsbury, supra note 134, at 696 (noting that a life verdict involves jurors seeing "the
offender as a member of their community," which prompts them to "care[] about him").
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sharpen our meaning when we speak of responsibility and guilt. We rebel
at the idea of collective responsibility and guilt because we assume it
denotes a sort of culpability attributed to society that is akin, or even
equivalent, to the culpability we emotionally want to attribute to the
guilty defendant. '8' We can avoid that conceptual error if we understand
that responsibility and guilt can be a consequence of political
affiliation.' s3 This is guilt in an associative sense, guilt that "adhere[s] to
the nation as such and not to the individual members." '84
Second, narratives of collective responsibility and guilt, of
distributed blame, discomfort us intellectually because we are locked into
a false dichotomy between deterministic accounts of human conduct
(rooted in the sentimentalism of victimization theory) and the tough-
minded rhetoric of autonomy and free will.' 8, When courts invoke the
notion of autonomy (or its proxy terms, like free choice, free will,
dignity), they presume to put a label on something real, something
palpable, some reified notion that is deemed worthy of protecting. But
the labeling short-circuits thought because the labeling permits courts to
invoke a rhetorically powerful idea to accomplish an outcome that is
most congenial to the smooth functioning of the criminal process. There
is no such thing as free will independent of some understanding of a
182. Not all guilt is the same. When a jury announces a criminal defendant "guilty" after trial, it is
not just stating a finding; it is declaring a state of affairs between the defendant and the community,
one that opens the way for the community to inflict punishment. A person may feel guilty even when
no rational community would adjudicate the person guilty. Consider William Styron's character
Sophie, in Sophie's Choice. See WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE (Vintage Int'l 1992) (1979). Sophie
is racked by debilitating guilt at having relinquished her daughter to certain death at the hands of the
Nazis. But she was in no way blameworthy for doing so. Her own subjective guilt-a "moral guilt," to
use Karl Jaspers' terminology (see Fletcher, supra note 151, at 1530-32)- is entirely distinct from her
juridical guilt.
183. Professor Fletcher's discussion of Karl Jaspers' notion of "political guilt"- "Everybody is co-
responsible for the way he is governed" -captures the idea well:
[Political guilt] attach[es] even in cases of living under dictatorships where it is not humanly
possible to avoid the inhuman actions of those in charge. Political guilt is borne by each
person in a political community merely by virtue of being there and being governed....
[P]olitical guilt derives from identification with the society and being there at that time.
Fletcher, supra note 151, at 1531.
184. Id. at 1540. Fletcher's discussion of associative guilt occurs in the context of international
affairs, which is unsurprising. Efforts to take into account the environment in which an individual's
horrendous conduct occurs is not at all uncommon in the international arena, where international
criminal tribunals are often urged to consider the "coercive environment" as a context to understand
the criminality. Accused persons in war-crime trials sometimes argue that cataclysmic events and the
associated breakdown of the social order diminish-even destroy-their personal control and
responsibility over their actions. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 159, at 605-so. What
distinguishes that situation from the typical capital-punishment situation is that the former often
involves criminality that does not violate a social norm, but actually promotes it. Nazi Germany
provides the most evident illustration, where mass killing and torture promoted the Nazi social order.
Collective responsibility and guilt are strongest in that setting.
185. Cf. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the.Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 596 (198i).
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deeper self that is capable of reflection and self-revision. That deeper
self-the self-revising, reflective self-is vulnerable to being, and often is,
warped by institutional and other outside forces; sometimes it is warped
so badly that we cannot rightly impose full responsibility upon that
person's freely willed action to inflict harm on another.
16
A powerful mitigation case can-indeed, must-free us from this
false dichotomy of autonomy versus determinism. It frees us by doing
what a skilled literary novelist does, one who strives to tell the truth
through fiction rather than engage in kitsch sentimentality that marks
most fiction. Skilled novelists are at war with the abstract, fighting to
expose false dichotomies. They show not that we are utterly free,
immune from the controlling or deterministic forces of social institutions
and culture; nor do they, with some possible exceptions (I have in mind
Franz Kafka), go in the opposite direction, portraying human beings as
utterly helpless in the face of overpowering institutional and other social
forces. They show our need as human beings to be connected to the
outside world, connected with others in authentic relationships.
Autonomy and free will and responsibility cannot be divorced from this
crucial human need for connectedness. And that is precisely why there
always exists the interrelationship of the individual and the collective, an
interrelationship that gives true meaning to the mitigation case.' 7
Think, for example, of Richard Wright's Native Son, the story of an
unremorseful killing, and consider whether any engaged reader would
endorse Bigger Thomas's execution. That's mitigation.' Wright brings
the reader into Bigger Thomas's life, not to render him a pawn of social
forces, but to link his particular moral agency with our own, to trap us
into casting a judgment on ourselves should we dare judge him.' 8 And so,
as readers, we avoid the trap; we avoid it because we understand that we
I86. See Wolf, supra note 62, at 148. "Hard determinism" -the philosophical aversion to free
will-threatens the idea of responsibility inasmuch as free will is understood to be crucial to finding
individuals to be responsible for their acts. See generally Goldberg, supra note 175, at 898 (discussing
"hard determinism"). But in the death-penalty context, the issue is not whether the capital defendant
lacks responsibility for the crime; rather, the issue is whether the defendant's conceded responsibility
for the crime warrants the extreme sanction of death. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73
(2005).
187. Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 175.
88. Bigger's crime, as a prosecutor would portray it: the unremorseful suffocation, decapitation,
and incineration of a young woman, followed by a plan to frame an innocent man for that killing and
to extort money from the victim's wealthy parents through a bogus ransom note, and then the rape
and killing of another young woman. RIcHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON, 98-108, 120, 128, 213, 269-77
(HarperPerennial 1989) (1940). Unremorseful is actually too mild a characterization of Bigger's
emotional response to the first killing. "Elation filled him." Id. at 12o. He felt "more than amply
justified" in what he'd done. Id. at 128. The second killing apparently did not emotionally register at
all.
189. Had Wright simply told a tale of deterministic forces manipulating a deprived black youth,
readers would have rightly rebelled at the bald suppression of the norm of moral agency, a norm that
few in our free-will-obsessed society are willing to reject completely.
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do not have the entitlement to judge, implicated and invested as we are
in Bigger Thomas's being-in-the-world.
I commend Native Son as a literary exemplar of a mitigation case
because skilled, experienced death-penalty advocates understand that a
mitigation presentation must be constructed in ways akin to how a
literary novelist constructs a tragic story. Like so many compelling
stories, a powerful mitigation case tells the story of individual human
failings within the context of societal failings, binding the individual and
the collective, and thus telling us of our unworthiness to cast full blame
on the individual, for we as a society have partaken in the crime.'"
A powerful mitigation case, therefore, combats the impetus to
understand the trial as merely a forum for assessing blame on a single,
autonomous individual. The penalty phase of a capital case becomes a
forum for distributing blame, for speaking of collective responsibility. It
becomes a forum for a different kind of truth, not the "microscopic and
logical truth"'9 ' that criminal trials produce through highly ritualized
processes. Rather, it becomes a forum for "experiential and dialogic
truths"'92 that speak to the defendant's experience as a being-in-the-
world, a being with an inner life influenced and often corrupted by
institutional forces that benefit some and harm others. The forum thus
invites a broader consideration of guilt, one deeply ensconced in Judeo-
Christian culture, where "guilt (asham) is understood as something like a
stain, a form of pollution on the people."'93 If the criminal act pollutes the
moral order, thus necessitating cleansing through punishment, it is fair to
ask in response, was the moral order polluted already such that the
criminal act grew out of it? And if so, what sort of cleansing is called for?
Through sentiments of collective responsibility -perhaps even
inklings of collective guilt-jurors confront another kind of violence, one
19o. Fletcher's discussion of collective guilt gestures at this idea of mitigation, though he situates
his discussion not in the context of capital cases, but in the very different context of punishing Nazi
war criminals like Adolph Eichmann in an international war-crimes tribunal. Fletcher suggestively
observes:
Considering the guilt of the nation in the sentencing process would provide a concrete and
practical way to recognize collective guilt in criminal trials. Recognizing the mitigating
effect of the nation's guilt would mitigate the responsibility of the offender, though perhaps
in many cases this guilt would remain sufficiently grave to justify severe punishment.
Fletcher, supra note 151, at 1539. Fletcher later muses, "If the dominant systems of belief encourage
actions like ... lynchings, gay bashings, or domestic violence, those who succumb to violence are
certainly to blame, but one has to wonder whether they alone are to blame and whether they must
bear the guilt alone." Id. at 1541. Fletcher thus concludes, albeit tentatively, that "those who generate
a climate of moral degeneracy bear some of the guilt for the criminal actions that are thereby
endorsed." Id. at 1541-42.
191. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1283 (2000).
192. Id.
193. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 170.
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beyond the horrors of the crime, which renders the defendant eligible but
not necessarily worthy of a death sentence. It is the violence of the
execution itself, a culminating act of community violence inflicted upon
one who has been defeated by a past replete with inflicted violence, some
(maybe even much) of it community inflicted, throughout a lifetime of
struggle and failure. This added confrontation with violence is essential
to effective death-penalty advocacy, and so it is a key ingredient in any
fair understanding of mitigation.'"
The focus on the individual defendant, and keeping outside of the
discourse any thought of collective responsibility or collective guilt, while
a symptom of the hold that autonomy has upon us, actually degrades the
humanity of the defendant-precisely the opposite of what we would
expect in adhering to the Autonomy Ideal. Once again let us note the
irony. The worthiness to punish, the moral justification for executing the
defendant, rests on the notion that the defendant acted with the
quintessential attribute of autonomy-the capacity for reason and free
choice. And yet that not-so-tacit conclusion depends upon the jury seeing
the defendant as less-than-human, as dehumanized. The Autonomy Ideal
drives the justification for punishment and then operates against those
very considerations that serve to humanize the offender and thereby
diminish the justification for punishment. Volunteering for execution at
the stage where the jury must decide worthiness for death is no emblem
of autonomy, even though we get seduced into allowing that act of
volunteering in the name of autonomy, for it is an act of capitulation,
laden with shame and defeat.
CONCLUSION
The rhetoric of autonomy and dignity have a hold on us in a way
that collective guilt and collective responsibility do not, because we are
embedded in a culture that is not just built on notions of autonomy and
dignity, but is defined by them. The classical Western Enlightenment
understanding of language is that it is a naming process, that there are
cognitive processes that preexist language and the need to communicate
the fruits of those processes calls for the use of language. Language is a
mere tool, and it is something we control.95 But, as we have seen from
the post-modernist assault upon this classical view of language,' 96 there is
'94. Cf. Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from
the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1124 (995) (observing how capital jurors receive a skewed presentation of
violence-the violence of the crime overwhelming, if not eclipsing, the violence that the law allows
through a death verdict).
195. See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCr 44-74 (1994).
r96. See John K. Simon, A Conversation with Michel Foucault, 2 PARTISAN REVIEW 201 (1971). See
also LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Harper
Torchbooks 1972) (1969).
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no preexisting cognitive process, no thinking that precedes language. We
do not use language so much as we are language."
So, when I say that the rhetoric of autonomy and dignity have a hold
on us, I do not merely suggest that scholars, judges and lawyers are
simply enamored with that rhetoric. I am suggesting that we are
manipulated by it. When the Faretta Court spoke of autonomy as the
"lifeblood of the law," it was not adjudicating a philosophical debate
over whether free will or determinism mirrors the actual world. It was
gesturing towards Herbert Packer's assertion that the ultimate function
of law "in a free society [is to] promot[e] human autonomy and the
capacity for individual human growth and development.'o When we
speak of autonomy in the context of legal discourse, we do not-because
we cannot-stake a claim about the human species as some definitive
fact. We do not mean to say that all persons have the developed capacity
to genuinely and authentically author their own destinies or that all life
choices are freely made or that deterministic social and impersonal forces
do not exist. "Human autonomy is an illusion if we make it conditional
on human perfection."'" The discourse of autonomy within the broader
discourse of criminal law stems from our aspirations, the cluster of
values, shifting and reconfiguring constantly, that we have chosen to
pursue through legal doctrine. It is not a metaphysical assertion about
free will or about the paraphernalia of some real world that exists outside
ourselves. It is a position we have chosen to take, a stance that allows us
to anchor the development of doctrine. The development of criminal-law
doctrine treats autonomy as if it were real and then we as a culture
manipulate ourselves into thinking it is real."
We manipulate ourselves in this way by forgetting that we have
chosen long ago to anchor our doctrinal developments in the criminal law
in the Autonomy Ideal, not for metaphysical reasons, but for value-
preference reasons, a preference to pursue a particular vision of the
social good. We proceed as if autonomy and free will actually exist as
real things, but then are blind to how such notions take over, how we
become used by the terminology. Imprisoned, if you will, by our
language.
Getting trapped into the limiting view of mitigation as a mercy-
inducing device is a symptom of what these remarks are gesturing at.
Viewing mitigation this way, of course, stacks the deck in favor of
197. Simon, supra note 196 (noting that Michel Foucault asserted we are determined in our
thinking by the very language we use). This idea, though fashionable in an age of post-structuralism,
has roots in Rousseau. See generally ROUSSEAU, ON ThE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (John H. Moran ed. and
trans., F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1966).
198. PACKER, supra note 15, at 65.
599. Id. at 66.
200. Id.
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allowing a capital defendant to veto a mitigation presentation. The
argument against allocating that power to capital defendants who wish to
express their autonomy by waiving mitigation cannot be dressed up to
foster the impression that it is about promoting sentencing reliability, for
that merely begs the question, why isn't reliability vindicated by a reliable
death-eligibility determination, coupled with the unfettered opportunity for
the defendant to seek mercy or leniency through a mitigation presentation?
Nor can the argument be couched in terms of protecting society's
commitment to the Lockett principle, where a capital sentence is ideally
imposed after an adversarial penalty-phase proceeding has taken place,"'
for that argument effectively violates the Kantian principle that an
individual ought not be treated as a means to a social end." 2 To be sure,
we might get around the Kantian objection by reframing the Lockett-
principle argument, putting it in terms of the inalienability of the rights
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. 203 But that approach has two
problems: one, it conflicts with Lockett itself, which speaks in terms of
promoting sentencing reliability through the opportunity to present
mitigation; 4 and two, it lapses back into the question-begging argument
noted earlier-namely, why must society recognize procedural rights as
inalienable? Resort to an inalienability argument, it seems to me, reflects
an unwillingness to chart a path towards understanding mitigation as
something not belonging to the defendant. The only option to avoid this
impasse is to reject the cramped, though conventional, view of
mitigation.
The way out, as I see it, after years of capital defense work and
thinking about effective capital-defense advocacy, 5 is to understand the
myth of demonic agency as the flip-side of what might be called the
"myth of collective innocence. ' 6 The struggle to transcend the hold
these myths have on us so they do not drive our use of the death penalty
is what mitigation must ultimately be about. This is mitigation beyond
the realm of mercy. This is mitigation that goes to the core of the moral
legitimacy of capital punishment, which is not whether a killer deserves
execution, but whether we are entitled to kill. This is mitigation
understood as a process of creating an unsettled consciousness on that
profound question of entitlement. This is mitigation understood as
something that belongs to the jury, delegates of the community who must
201. See Carter, supra note 20, at 105-o6 (arguing against mitigation waiver, relying principally on
the Lockett principle).
202. KANT, GROUNDWORK, supra note 54, at 154-55.
203. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, Ioo HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1852 (1987)
(stating "inalienability negates the possibility of separation" of the right from the holder of that right).
204. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 6o5 (1978).
205. See DANIEL R. WILLIAMS, EXECUTING JUSTICE: AN INSIDE AccouNT OF THE CASE OF MUMIA
ABU-JAMAL (2001).
206. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 159, at 580, 6o4.
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decide the community's entitlement to kill, not the capital defendant who
seeks to smother it? This is mitigation that takes aim at us, the
collective, for it is we who must do the killing, we who must remain
vigilant guardians of dignity.28 Arguments about paternalism, therefore,
are entirely misplaced,2" for the Autonomy Ideal ought not form the
philosophical foundation for keeping the jury-the stand-in for the
collective-from addressing its own entitlement to kill. Allocating that
power to a capital defendant-no matter how thoughtful the mitigation-
waiver decision might be-patently denies that effective mitigation
reveals a capital crime to be both an individual act of evil and a social
failing, the culmination of a social phenomenon for which we all bear
responsibility in a deep associative sense.
The position I have staked out here could be defended at a higher
level of abstraction. Penalty-phase litigation, we might say, is a contest
over conceptual schemes-one hinging on ideas about individualized
blame and the competitor scheme hinging on ideas about exogenous
forces and influences that undercut or diminish blameworthiness. How
we describe these competing conceptual schemes is less important than
seeing that the decisionmaking endeavor involves a contest between
them. The act of choosing between conceptual schemes-whether in the
pressure-cooker of death-penalty deliberations or in faculty lounges-is
an act of embracing an integrated system of values. And when the
conceptual schemes involve contested matters of social existence, the
values we are talking about are necessarily moral values. It is no surprise,
then, that we understand the jury's sentencing judgment in a capital case
to be a moral one. The integrity of that act of choosing between
conceptual schemes is not something over which a capital defendant
ought to have ultimate control. Influence? Sure, but that is just a
consequence of the practicalities associated with litigating any case-
litigants have the personal power to withhold their own testimony and
207. The difficulty in presenting a powerful mitigation case should be apparent. And it should be
apparent why a plea for mercy-and indeed, even to hinge a case for life on the plea for mercy-is the
weakest form of advocacy in a capital case, short of no advocacy at all. The defendant is in no position
to ask for mercy, and the jury really has no compelling reason to grant it. In fact, granting mercy for
many jurors smacks of disrespecting the victim, something prosecutors routinely remind jurors of.
Where was the mercy when the defendant plunged his knife into the helpless victim, stabbing her
repeatedly as she gasped her last breaths, clinging to life. More fundamentally, mercy is at odds with
mitigation in the sense that mercy depends on a recognition of guilt and moral desert for punishment.
The most powerful mitigation dilutes guilt, distributes it beyond the individual defendant, and thereby
calls into question exactly what does the defendant deserve. Mercy, in short, implies the person
deserves to die, but for reasons aside from just deserts he should be spared that fate.
208. See DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMINION, supra note 52, at 259 n.23.
209. See supra note 135 (noting the paternalism objection to disallowing mitigation waiver); cf.
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 970-71 (1987)
(arguing that antipaternalism rooted in individualism fails to account for dignity-based impositions on
individuals rooted in entitlements belonging to the community and not the individual).
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the potential power to influence others to do the same. But to remove
from the jury's consideration the meaningful consideration of competing
conceptual schemes is something altogether different.
Finally, there is the useful illusion. The notion of promoting
autonomy by allowing defendants to waive mitigation reinforces an
illusion that society is willing to entail costs in respecting individual
freedom, a useful illusion that bolsters our image of nobility as a society.
But the ugly truth is, the Autonomy Ideal in this setting is a rhetorical
device to arrive at a result that promotes order, fluidity, and uniformity
in the capital sentencing process-attributes of capital jurisprudence that
the Supreme Court has for almost two decades regarded as most
important. '° We have the doctrinal tools to deal with a mitigation waiver:
insist upon a detailed colloquy between the judge and the defendant to
ensure that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; inquire
vigorously into competency; and then proceed with the penalty-phase
proceeding with all the trappings of the adversarial process intact
(prosecutorial argument, jury charge, jury deliberation). Legitimacy is
achieved through process and our professions of freedom are vindicated
by a tough-minded fidelity to autonomy.
By contrast, we do not have ready-made tools to smoothly deal with
disallowing mitigation waivers. Any response committed to getting
mitigation evidence to the jury over an objecting defendant would be
messy." ' And whatever mitigation evidence finds its way to the jury
without the defendant's cooperation and endorsement would necessarily
be a partial evidentiary presentation. And that's the rub, isn't it? If
reliability is what we are after-whatever that means-then how much
mitigation is enough mitigation to inspire confidence that the outcome is
reliable? Might a court-mandated partial presentation provoke
destabilizing thoughts that no mitigation presentation-even those with
full support by the defendant-is a full presentation? Isn't it better to
cram such uncomfortable questions in the dark attic, away from our
doctrinal fetishism over fair process?
Allowing mitigation waivers supposedly acknowledges the
paramount importance of autonomy while conveniently sweeping such
questions under the blanket of adhering to the elaborate procedural rules
governing capital prosecution.2 That process fetishism, which the
Ashworth-type argument exemplifies, projects the illusion of institutional
210. See WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN
SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 207 (1991) (observing that "maintaining the smooth functioning of our
system of capital punishment is a higher priority [to the Court] than protecting the rights of capital
defendants").
211. See Carter, supra note 20, at 149 (discussing possible solutions and their difficulties).
212. See generally Steiker & Steiker, supra note 84, at 357-59 (arguing that the procedural
labyrinth of capital jurisprudence legitimates capital punishment).
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competence. And that illusion elides the uncomfortable truth that
believing we can get enough information to adjudicate death worthiness
when we are dealing with the complexities of human existence may be
the epitome of arrogance. Trying to give the jury enough information to
resolve the unresolvable may well be a fool's errand, for the goal of
reliable sentencing may be utterly unattainable."3 So, disallowing
mitigation waivers threatens to expose how absurd the enterprise is. But
by allowing it, the criminal justice system propagates the image of a
process that accords defendants with all the rights that are needed to
justify the enterprise and reinforces the image of a society respectful of
individual liberty and, through the sheer force and seduction of rhetoric
alone, dedicated to the ideal of autonomy.
213. See STEPHEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE: THE IMMORALITY OF PUNISHING BY DEATH 90-94
(2d ed. 2ooi).
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